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Abstract
A perfect storm of ethnic-based violence is on the horizon, spurred on by increasing diversity,
climate change, and the inability of many societies to handle these trends. This thesis examines the ways
through which elites are incentivized to build institutions promoting a specific type of identity and how
institutional structures use different means to promote the desired identity. It also addresses the ways
through which state-based identity can be adapted to be inclusive while remaining salient. This will be
done both through examinations of existing theory surrounding state structure and identity as well as two
case studies where identity is a key factor. The first case study being development of identity in Kosovo,
which embarked on an institutionally-based process of forming a civic-national identity after its
independence in 2008. The case of Kosovo demonstrates how states with a recent history of ethnic
conflict can institutionalize civic-national identities and in doing so, reduce the incidence of ethnic
violence. The second case is that of Israel and the West Bank where an examination of how the
ethnonational identities of the region were formed and the potential outcomes should a one-state solution
be implemented demonstrate how different incentives lead to the construction of various institutional
regimes. It concludes by using the two case studies to demonstrate how the institutionalization of civicnational identities can decrease the occurrence of ethnic conflict and how examining state institutions can
give an overview of the politically salient identities within a state’s borders.
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Introduction
A perfect storm of ethnic-based violence is on the horizon, spurred on by increasing diversity,
climate change, and the inability of many societies to handle these trends. In areas across the globe, the
populist use of nationalist sentiment has given rise to increased conflict and the promotion of more
homogenous states and societies. Regions such as Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia
have all had conflicts instigated and maintained by ethnonationalist sentiment. Simultaneously, ethnic
identities are becoming increasingly important throughout Western Europe and the Americas. Ethnicbased social cleavages have become institutionally validated by peace processes driven by the assumption
that separation of feuding ethnicities or the imposition of power sharing measures would be beneficial.
However, institutions formed post-conflict often serve to further the salience of ethnic conflict. As trends
of immigration, globalization, and other threats to the stability of the existing state system continue to
grow in severity and importance, it is more than necessary to find a way to reduce the salience of ethnicbased identity and instead work towards forming a civic-national identity.
States play an integral role in socializing their citizens into a desired identity. These identities can
be based upon a certain ethnic group, as is common in the Gellnerian nation-state.1 Some states attempt to
ensure loyalty to the state through the institutionalization of ensured representation for ethnic groups
through power-sharing or other means, thus constructing the state as an arbiter between group or as a
means through which to ensure all groups benefit.2 Other forms of identity are founded on a non-ethnic
basis and may instead be based on birth or residence in a certain territory, sometimes rejecting ethnic
identity as a whole and instead homogenizing individuals into a distinct new identity.3 In contrast to the
other forms of identity, the construction of a civic-national identity allows for the expression of minority
ethnic identities while forming a cohesive non-ethnic identity based on citizenship and shared values.4

1

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O'Leary, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2013), 287
3
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "Place, Kinship and the Case for Non‐ Ethnic Nations," Nations and Nationalism 10, nos. 1-2
(February 2004): 50, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00154.x.
4
David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000), 9.
2
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While many articulations of non-ethnic identity struggle to achieve acceptance throughout a state, civicnationalism can be a successful means through which states can decrease the likelihood of ethnic conflict
and increase loyalty to the state by forming binding ties between ethnic groups while allowing the
preservation of the cultures of individual ethnic groups.5 This means that states institutionalizing a civicnational identity do not need to compete against the appeal of ethnic identification to the same level that
states attempting to suppress ethnic identity do. The ability of civic-national identities to coexist with
some levels of ethnic attachment is especially important as it precludes ethnic appeals as a means to rally
opposition to the state.6 This thesis will demonstrate how civic-national identity can reduce the likelihood
of ethnic conflict and allow for inter-ethnic reconciliation and state stability even in regions with a recent
history of ethnic violence.
The Resurgence of Ethnonationalism
The rise of ethnonationalist sentiment is often correlated with dissatisfaction with globalization
and greater levels of international migration. Far-right movements emerging officially as oppositions to
globalization often manifest through ethnonationalist rhetoric and appeals to an idealized history of a
more homogenous society.7 Continuing increases in global migration have led to greater cultural mixing
and greater perceived threats against the cultural integrity of the native-born population.8 At the end of
2017 approximately 258 million people lived outside their state of birth, which marked an increase of
49% as compared to 2000.9 Ten percent of those migrants were asylum seekers or refugees, with the
majority of refugees being located in middle and low income states.10 The number of cases of forced
displacement has been worsened by the approximately 26-38 ongoing global conflicts, some of which
5

Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnic and Civic Nationalism: Towards a New Dimension," in Nation and National Identity: The European
Experience in Perspective, by Hanspeter Kriesi (Chur: Rüger, 1999), 60.
6
Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 49,
https://iiss.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396339308442673.
7
Andrej Zaslove, "Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an Anti-Globalization
Movement," Comparative European Politics 6, no. 2 (July 2008): 172,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110126.
8
Rogers Brubaker, "Economic Crisis, Nationalism, and Politicized Ethnicity," in The Deepening Crisis: Governance Challenges
after Neoliberalism, by Craig J. Calhoun and Georgi M. Derluguian (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 93.
9
"World Migration Report," United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlight
s.pdf.
10
Ibid.
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have provoked massive refugee crises.11,12 The response from international bodies such as the European
Union has, in many cases, been massively unpopular. A 2018 Pew opinion poll reported that the lowest
approval rating for the EU’s handling of the refugee crisis was 7% in Greece with the highest being 37%
in the Netherlands. Individuals in sates serving as primary entrance points for refugees into the EU
reported greater disapproval than those in states solely bordering the sea and other EU member states.13
This trend has driven greater Euroscepticism in areas such as the United Kingdom, where
opposition to perceived excessive EU regulations and the EU policy of free movement played a large part
in the Brexit vote. The surge in populist sentiment has played a role in remaining EU member states such
as Germany, where the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) has become the main opposition party in the
Bundestag, Hungary and Poland, both of which have experienced serious authoritarian backsliding in
recent years, and other EU member states14,15,16
These trends have undermined trust in international institutions and multilateral bodies and led to
an upswing in populist sentiment that can manifest as ethnonationalism.17 Elites have often used
ethnonationalist appeals to turn mass sentiment against migrants through references to the preservation of
culture or history. It has also led to a backlash towards multiculturalism in general, with an average of
55% of people surveyed across 10 EU states saying all migration from Muslim-majority states should be
stopped. This majority has held in all surveyed states except for Spain and the United Kingdom. 18
Especially in Southern and Eastern Europe, individuals are increasingly stating that diversity makes their

11

"Global Conflict Tracker," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/.
"Mapped: A World at War," IRIN, https://www.irinnews.org/maps-and-graphics/2017/04/04/updated-mapped-world-war.
13
A Majority of Europeans Favor Taking in Refugees, but Most Disapprove of EU's Handling of the Issue," Pew Research
Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/19/a-majority-of-europeans-favor-taking-in-refugees-but-mostdisapprove-of-eus-handling-of-the-issue/.
14
Sofia Vasilopoulou, "UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum," The Political Quarterly 87, no. 1 (May 18, 2016): ,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.12258.
15
AfD: What You Need to Know about Germany's Far-Right Party," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-knowabout-germanys-far-right-party/a-37208199.
16
Bojan Bugaric and Alenka Kuhelj, "Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?," Hague Journal on the
Rule of Law 10, no. 1 (April 2018): , https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40803-018-0075-4.pdf.
17
Jack Snyder, "The Broken Bargain," Foreign Policy, last modified March 2019,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-02-12/broken-bargain.
18
"Most Europeans Want Immigration Ban from Muslim-Majority Countries, Poll Reveals," The Independent,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/most-europeans-want-muslim-ban-immigration-control-middle-eastcountries-syria-iran-iraq-poll-a7567301.html.
12
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state a worse place to live, with some states reporting that over half of their population held this opinion.19
No European state had a majority of respondents stating diversity made their state a better place to live.
This perception of immigration as a threat to society furthers incentives for political elites to promote
ethnonationalist identities in order to maintain political power, creating a self-reinforcing cycle that sows
the seeds of ethnic conflict.
This trend seems unlikely to stop anytime soon. Climate change will serve as a powerful force
multiplier in future conflicts, increasing the likelihood of migration due to the increased frequency of
natural disasters, frequency of flooding due to sea level rise, and conflict related to resource scarcity
among other things.20 This means that climate change will continue to increase factors that lead to
upswings in populist and nativist sentiment. This will be exacerbated by the fact that in times of economic
difficulty and resource scarcity not only do humans tend to protect the interests of their ethnic or racial ingroup but the boundaries of the in-group become tighter and less inclusive. This has been shown by
studies demonstrating that in periods of difficulty, individuals tend to exclude biracial people from their
perceived in-group.21 Thus, not only is it likely that the future will hold greater global migration for
economic and humanitarian reasons, but it is also likely that global resource difficulties will cause a
resurgence of nativist and restrictive in-group vs. out-group thinking. This will remain true so long as
ethnic and national identities remain one of the more salient aspects of political identity. While in-groups
and out-groups exist in civic-national states, the state-based cohesion would allow greater cooperation
within the state, limiting restrictive thinking to between states, which can be mitigated through existing
international means.
Ethnonationalism in one region often influences and legitimizes the expression of
ethnonationalist sentiment elsewhere. The perpetrator of the 2011 Norway attacks, which killed 96 people
in an attack in Norway in 2011, cited Balkan nationalists as some of his key role models. His manifesto,
19

Europeans Not Convinced Growing Diversity Is a Good Thing, Divided on What Determines National Identity," Pew Research
Center, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-not-convinced-growing-diversity-is-a-good-thing-divided-on-whatdetermines-national-identity/.
20
Ragnhild Nordas, "Climate Change and Conflict," Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007).
21
Christopher Rodeheffer, "Does This Recession Make Me Look Black? The Effect of Resource Scarcity on the Categorization of
Biracial Faces," Psychological Science, 2012
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2083: A European Declaration of Independence, referenced “Kosovo” 143 times, “Serb” 341 times,
“Bosnia” 343 times, and “Albania” 208 times.22 In his manifesto, he states his admiration for the work of
Serbian ethnonationalists in attempting to regain control of Kosovo and uses the Bosnian War and the
continuation of Bosnia’s existence as a partial justification of his actions.23 The perpetrator of the 2019
Christchurch attacks in New Zealand played a song honoring Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan
Karadzic during the attacks and who in his manifesto cited his desire to “Balkanize” the United States in
order to prevent the US from intervening in situations such as Kosovo in the future.24 He also marked his
weapons with the names of Balkan nationalists who fought against the Ottoman Empire and who in later
wars in the region committed atrocities against Muslim-majority populations.25 These two cases are part
of a broader pattern that demonstrates the fact that ethnic violence in one region rarely remains contained
to that area and may incite violence even continents away.
At the center of many conflicts is the question of the role of ethnicity in determining the character
of the state and the political life of its citizens. Within the Balkan region, all states with the exception of
Montenegro, Kosovo, and Bosnia define themselves explicitly as the national homeland of a distinct
ethnic group. Bosnia has a political system completely structured around the question of ethnicity. Its
constitution mandates ethnic-based allocations for all segments of the government, including its tripartite
presidency which consists of one Croat, one Serb, and one Bosniak.26 This has at times been taken to the
extreme, prohibiting individuals who are not members of the three constituent “nations” from running for
political office27. Kosovo, however, has made distinct progress in the area of creating a unifying civicnational identity despite its recent history of ethnic violence. Within the eleven years since Kosovo’s
independence, the vote share going to ethnonationalist parties has decreased markedly and the instance of
22

"Breivik's Balkan Obsession," The Economist, https://www.economist.com/eastern-approaches/2011/07/25/breiviks-balkanobsession.
23
"2083: A European Declaration of Independence," Archive,
https://archive.org/stream/2083_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence/2083_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence_
djvu.txt.
24
Maja Zivanovic, "New Zealand Mosque Gunman 'Inspired by Balkan Nationalists,'" Balkan Insight,
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/15/new-zealand-mosque-gunman-inspired-by-balkan-nationalists/.
25
Ibid.
26
"European Court Rules Bosnian Constitution Discriminatory," Balkan Insight,
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/strasbourg-court-rules-bosnian-constitution-discriminatory-06-09-2016.
27
Ibid.
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ethnic violence has also seen a stark decrease from 2008 to 2018.28 This improvement demonstrates that
even in cases of recent ethnic violence, states are not doomed to either face a resurgence of conflict or
institute policies legitimizing ethnic identification. As will be discussed later, the case of Kosovo
demonstrates the means through which institutions can be shaped that allow for the formation of salient
non-ethnic identities, even in regions where ethnic identity has been the traditional form of political
association.
In the Middle East, elements of ethnic-based political organization remain salient. The Israeli
Knesset in 2018 passed the “Nation-State Law”, one of the Israeli Basic Laws that make up its informal
constitution, and which officially declares Israel the “nation-state of the Jewish people”. This claim was
mirrored by that of the Palestinian constitution passed in 2003 which declared functionally the same
territory the national homeland of the Palestinian people. Thus, the strong salience of ethnic-based
identities within this region has been reinforced by state structure in a similar way to that of identities in
the Balkans. This has led to entrenched conflicts that are largely unsolvable so long as ethnicity remains
the most salient factor of identity. The case of Israel and the West Bank will be examined later in order to
first examine how incentives shape the decisions of political elites in terms of which identities are
promoted as well as how incentives and institutions could potentially be reshaped, using the case of
Kosovo as an example, in order to promote non-ethnic identities.
Despite similar circumstances regarding a history of ethnic conflict, the presence of pockets of
concentrated minority groups, and a history of colonization by the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo has taken a
starkly different approach to the institutionalization of identity when compared with Israel and the West
Bank. This thesis will seek to examine how national identity is constructed by and within the context of
international disputes and competing claims to territory, culture, and history. It will do so by examining
and comparing two cases of disputes driven by territorial and identity-based factors: the Kosovo-Serbia
conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More specifically, it will look at the cases of north Kosovo

28

Human Right Watch, "Serbia/Kosovo," World Report, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/countrychapters/serbia/kosovo.
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and the West Bank. While both conflicts have been partially instigated and maintained by ethnic-based
nationalist sentiment, the inclusion of north Kosovo and the West Bank allows for the analysis of how
minority groups, especially territorially concentrated minority groups, are affected by institutional
promotions of identity.
This thesis will examine first the relationship between institutional structures, such as electoral
incentives or foreign pressure, and the politically relevant identities of citizens within ethnically
heterogenous states. It will take a closer look at how altered incentive structures influence the decisions of
elites within states to promote one type of identity over another in order to see how the types of altered
incentives affect institutional identity-related structures. It will also use an index of institutional identity
underpinned by the work of Liberman and Singh to evaluate how effective institutional structures are at
reflecting the politically salient identities of the citizens of a particular state.29 Finally, it will seek to
answer the following question: is it plausible that a non-ethnic political formula based on identity to unite
these peoples could develop? It will test the hypothesis that certain incentives as well as changes in elite
structure shape which identities state institutions promote. It will then test the hypothesis that with the
correct institutional structure, a civic-national identity can help decrease the political salience of ethnic
identity in regions with recent experiences of ethnic conflict.

Chapter One: Theory and Methodological Framework
Institutions and Identity
The institutional structures of modern states socialize their citizens into specific identities in a
variety of ways. For the purpose of this thesis, institutions are defined as the structures that organize the
society of a state and organize the relationship of a state to its citizens, citizens to their state, and citizens

29

Evan S. Lieberman and Prerna Singh, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Politics: An Institutional Complement to
Demographic, Behavioral, and Cognitive Approaches," Studies in Comparative International Development 47, no. 3 (September
2012): 256, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-012-9100-
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to one another.30 Institutions can be formal, such as the military of a state or its legislature, or informal,
such as norms governing interactions within a society. These informal norms may contravene or
contradict the official institutions of a state, but often have greater relevance to citizens than do formal
institutions.31 An identity for the purposes of this thesis is a category an individual can define themselves
as part of and most individuals have multiple ethnicities, some more important to them than others, and
have some, albeit limited, capacity to switch between salient identifications.32 A politically relevant
identity is one an individual chooses, consciously or subconsciously, as their most relevant identity for the
purpose of defining their identity as it relates to their state and ethnic or cultural groups.33
The institutional regimes of states serve to reinforce or construct the preferred state identity. The
development of systems leading to widespread formalized mass education and literacy led to the
possibility that a comprehensive national identity could be spread through a region or state. Mass
education and developing linguistic cohesion within states thus enabled the creation of modern
nationalism, which relies upon the construction of a national identity containing three main components:
1) a “nation” created from an idealized history of a group, which formed a “state of mind”34 that is willed
into existence and “lives in the hearts and minds of its members”35, 2) binding ties such as ethnicity or
language that can be inherited through birth or early childhood education36, and 3) a way of differentiating
between the in-group and out-group while making it difficult to move from one to another. These nations,
which form the basis for the Gellnerian nation-state, are usually connected to a specific ethnic group.37
Through the process of socialization into a national identity, in a nation-state, the ethnic identity and
30

Arthur Denzau and Douglass North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos 47, no. 1 (February 1994): 5,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02246.x.
31
nformal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda 2, no. 4 (December 2004): 725,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/11A6AA9DCAF579F5B72DA250728AA513/S1537592704040472a.pdf/div-class-title-informal-institutionsand-comparative-politics-a-research-agenda-div.pdf.
32
Mary Waters, Ethnic Options (n.p.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 16.
33
Leoine Huddy, "Group Identity and Political Cohesion," in Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An
Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, by Robert H. Scott and Marlis C. Buchmann (Hoboken, NJ: WileyBlackwell, 2015), 3.
34
Hagen Schulze and William E. Yuill, States, Nations, and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present (Oxford, UK:
Blackwell, 1996), 98.
35
Schulze and Yuill, States, Nations, 102.
36
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
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national identity become intertwined, which is not the case for a civic-national national identity or other
non-ethnic forms of state-level identities.
A number of key characteristics differentiate ethnic identity from other forms of identity. An
ethnic identity is then one where identity is contingent on descent-based attributes where all siblings are
eligible to share they identity and the identity is composed of a subset of the general human population.38
Within nation-states, state institutions combine ethnic identities and aspects of a perceived common
history and cultural attributes to create a national identity that prioritizes one ethnic group above others.39
In promoting this group, nation-states often also engage in policies of state homogenization, either via
forced or voluntary assimilation of minority groups or, in extreme but not infrequent cases, ethnic
cleansing or genocide.40
States with multiethnic populations and without a desire to promote one ethnic identity over
others are faced with a number of potential institutional structures that could promote various types of
inclusive identities. These institutional regimes seek to develop a loyalty to the state, rather than to an
ethnic group. One such identity is the idea of the “melting pot” state, where the identities of multiple
ethnic groups are mixed and subsumed under an inclusive umbrella identity of the state as a whole.41
Another is that of the “cultural mosaic” form of multiethnic national identity, in which the identities of
various ethnic groups continue to exist separate from one another, but as complimentary parts of a
cohesive whole.42 Another state type along this line is that of a multinational state similar to that of the
Soviet Union or former Yugoslavia in which distinct nations are recognized and given specific national
rights, but under a similar umbrella identity that serves to supersede the individual national identities.43
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Another type of non-ethnic identity is that of civic-nationalism. In contrast to other forms of nonethnic identity, civic nationalism seeks to neither homogenize groups into one culture nor to
institutionalize the various ethnic identities of all of its citizens, but rather, to promote allegiance to a
common set of values. In a state institutionalizing a civic-national identity, allegiance is to “a community
of equal, rights‐ bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and
values.”44 This type of nationalism is tied to the notion of constitutional democracy, where the values
enshrined in a state’s constitution form the unifying factor for the creation of a national identity rather
than that of ethnicity, making a state where one can “opt-in” and “opt-out” of membership without
fulfilling ethnic criteria.45 Will Kymlicka describes the civic nation as “a conception of national identity
which is post‐ ethnic and multicultural; both emphasize the linguistic and institutional integration of
immigrants, while simultaneously accepting and accommodating the expression of immigrant
ethnicity.”46 Thus, institutions within a civic-national state allow for the expression of minority cultures
while incorporating and integrating them into state structures and institutions and establishing other
means of binding citizens together, such as the acceptance of common values.
Another key difference between multiethnic states and monoethnic nation-states is that of the idea
of the diaspora. For nation-states, members of the nation living outside of its borders are perceived to still
be connected to the nation-state itself as members of its diaspora population. Civic nations and
multiethnic nations, in contrast, lack the same sort of ties to those outside their borders as national identity
in these states are confined to those living within state borders and governed by the constitution shaping
the state and its citizens’ identity. In a world where transnational ties become easier, diasporic identities
present other considerations for the formation of non-ethnic based state identities, namely the question of
the feasibility of state cohesion in the presence of hybrid identities, the question of to what degree social
cohesion in multiethnic societies requires the assimilation of minorities, and if liberal democratic values
44
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can supersede ethnic and kin-based ties in an era of globalization when it is easier than ever to maintain
them.47 Furthermore, ethnic and civic-national identities are not always dichotomous. One blend is that of
a hybrid civic-ethnic national identity where ties to one ethnic group are combined with allegiances to
values and, in rare cases, the foreign states that share them.48 In these cases, individuals with high levels
of ethnic attachment while maintaining an inclusive identity to ethnic out-group members, especially
those who share certain values.49
There are a number of benefits to institutional constructions other than those promoting
ethnonational attitudes, especially institutional structures such as those found in polyethnic states and
similar variants. First, a thoughtful process of state-driven identity construction that creates a non-ethnic
overarching identity could serve to lessen the salience of ethnic identity for citizens living within such a
state, diminishing the chances of ethnic conflict and diminishing the ability of populists or similar
demagogues to use ethnicity as a rallying point.50 Second, population diversity itself brings benefits that
can only be truly actualized if this diversity is embraced rather than tolerated. The multiculturalism that
would come from a polyethnic state would provide a number of benefits such as advantages for collective
creativity, linguistic and cultural expertise. These advantages would serve as a positive benefit for both
the economy of a state in the increasingly globalized international economy and for a state’s diplomatic
and clandestine services.
An official policy of multiculturalism serves as a catalyst to attract skilled immigrants and to
assist in establishing a firm system of meritocracy and social mobility for those already residing within a
state, reducing the incidence of long-term poverty concentrated in certain minority ethnic groups.51 Thus,
polyethnic states with official policies of multicultural acceptance have increased benefits in state
competitiveness not afforded to more standard nation-states due to their prioritization of one culture and
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one ethnic group over all others.52 Finally, there is the fact that global migration patterns and
globalization, which has not stopped despite populist opposition, means that mixing of cultures and
immigration across borders is likely inevitable and in many cases, including those of the case studies in
question, has occurred already. The most logical and most humanitarian response is thus to find a way to
use these changes for the betterment of the states in question.
It is important also to note that unlike with religion or similar topics, the state itself cannot be
neutral in terms of constructing identity for those within its borders.53 Everyday actions coming from the
state play a role in the formation and validation of the identities of its citizens and there is no way for a
state to extract itself from this cycle without abdicating many of the responsibilities it holds. The national
identity of a state and the nations included within its borders, are kept alive through a series of banal and
mundane daily practices often carried out with the assistance of state institutions.54 These practices serve
to form and reinforce the identity of the state and ensure it maintains salient to its citizens even outside of
times of crisis.55 Thus, the key question in regards to the role of the state in institutionalizing and
promoting identities within its borders is not if the state is doing so but rather what identity the state is
promoting. Furthermore, there is the question of if the identity promoted by the state is capable of being
salient to all individuals within its borders or only to some, thus leaving open room for the development
of alternate key identities that may be antagonistic towards the identity of the state and thus promote
secessionism or related desires. These questions are especially important for states with a history of ethnic
conflict and existing tensions between ethnic and sectarian groups within its borders as proceeding along
with an ethnic-based state identity without modifications often leads to a resurgence in ethnic-based
conflict.
The idea of modification to a state’s population or borders to better accommodate ethnic divisions
of course has a long and horrifying history of violence, human rights abuses, and other forms of ethnic
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cleansing. Secession does, however, in certain cases exist as a legal option under international law either
with the consent of the host state or in exceptional circumstances, such as those resulting from acts of
genocide.56 Power-sharing agreements have been another proposed way to facilitate the creation of
multiethnic states in states with histories of ethnic conflict and division, but the examples of states such as
Lebanon and Bosnia demonstrate that at times they only serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages.
However, there are examples of such agreements leading to more peaceful, if tenuous, domestic situations
such as with the Good Friday agreement regarding Ireland and Northern Ireland. However, in all cases,
such power-sharing agreements have led to even greater degrees of polarization in the self-proclaimed
identities of citizens.57 Other agreements, such as mutually agreed upon assimilation, internal
homogenization through state structures such as the federally administered educational system, the
formation of consociational democracies, and outside management and arbitration offer additional options
for the management of multiethnic populations.
The formation of civic-national identities provides another option for the management of diverse
populations. Some evidence exists supporting the construction of a common identity as a means through
which to decrease the incidence of ethnic violence. Research done using Kenya and Tanzania
demonstrates that active institutional attempts to form a salient state-level identity decrease ethnic
violence.58 Furthermore, the study shows that state-level efforts to form a salient national identity increase
the effectiveness of public goods provisioning to heterogeneous communities within the state. The case of
Tanzania also demonstrates the importance of key institutions in forming a salient state-level identity.59
Experiments done in Mostar, a city in Bosnia divided between Croats and Bosniaks, also shows that
ethnic heterogeneity leads to increased pro-social behaviors and altruism between ethnic groups among
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students, even in a region with a very recent history of ethnic violence between the two groups.60 This
study further demonstrates that the institutional arrangements of the state are key to allowing this prosocial behavior to emerge by allowing for the sanctioning of non-cooperating members.61 The belief in
the ability of a common national identity to reduce the salience of intolerant ethnic identities ties into the
Common In-Group Identity Model (CIIM). This model suggests that the formation of a salient national
identity could lead to decreased ethnic identification between individuals due to the tradeoff between
ethnic and national identification.62

A Framework for Examining the Institutionalization of Identity
In order to examine institutional shifts, I coded the institutionalization of identity types using an
index similar to a model developed by Lieberman and Singh. This model uses an institutional approach to
the study of ethnic politics and focuses on the role of institutions and other legal methods in increasing or
reducing the salience of ethnic identity.63 An important part of the measurement of institutionalization of
ethnic identity done by Lieberman and Singh is that institutions that effectively reinforce ethnic divisions
but are officially non-ethnic are not considered to create ethnic boundaries.64 Only institutions that
explicitly create ethnic divisions are coded as being or creating ethnic boundaries. As will be
demonstrated in the section on Israel and the West Bank, the exclusion of information regarding the
impact in practice of institutional structures overlooks implicit but still meaningful ethnic boundaries. In
order to incorporate these distinctions, each indicator is coded for both the explicit institutional structures
and the implementation of these structures.65
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Each indicator is divided into one representing the formal elements of the variable, which may or
may not be properly implemented, and one representing the implementation of the variable in question.
The chosen indicators were determined based on the institutions most prominent in socializing individuals
into certain identities according to existing literature. For example, the curriculum of a state’s educational
system has historically been one of the main ways states socialize citizens into a desired identity. The
composition of the military and restrictions on enlistment also clearly indicate preferences for one group
over another and can play a major role in reinforcing or combatting the ethnonationalist identities of
states.66 Imposed restrictions on democratic participation such as voting or protest also impact and
indicate the character of the state and play a role in the degree to which political elites are required to take
all interests into account.67 The question of if there is equal provision of public goods throughout the state
also demonstrates if there is state preference for one group over another and can lead to either greater
investment in the state and thus acceptance of the state-level identity or the evolution of feelings of
resentment towards the state depending on the actions of state institutions in this area.68 Symbolic
representations of the identity of the state also indicate the desired character of the state. Similarly,
requirements to declare ethnic or national affiliation on ID cards often plays a role in establishing the
character of the state and in extreme cases of ethnonational states, can facilitate ethnic violence.69
The indicators are scored on a scale of -2 to 2, with -2 representing implementation or legislation
that would be found in a pure ethnonationalist state and 2 representing implementation or legislation that
would be found in a pure civic-national state. An average is then taken of the total score, which then
represents a metric of the overall character of the state. For Kosovo, the index is coded for both the Serbmajority north (Mitrovica District) and Albanian-majority south while in the second case it is coded for
Israel and the West Bank. The integration of the implementation score, as well as additional indicator
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variables, allows for the examination of not only how the institutional structures of states reflect the
desired identity but also how successful these institutions are at promoting the desired identity or if nonexplicit aspects of institutions continue to reinforce ethnonational identities or ethnic divides.
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Chapter Two: The Republic of Kosovo
After the death of Josip Broz Tito and the fall of Yugoslav communism, the area that now makes
up the Republic of Kosovo went through three distinct periods of institutional arrangement. The first set
of institutions were those imposed after the revocation of Kosovar autonomy under the government of
Slobodan Milosevic. The second set of institutions were those established during the period of
international trusteeship under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The third and current set
of institutions are those established after the 2008 Kosovar declaration of independence, which have since
been moderately altered. Throughout these three periods, the elites of Kosovar society remained relatively
constant within and across ethnic groups. Despite this consistency in elites, the different incentive
structures that shaped the three periods led to the formation of distinct institutional structures that
promoted different identities as the ones around which to base political organization and decision-making.
This section first demonstrates how shifts in incentive structures for political elites in Kosovo
altered the type of identities promoted by state institutions. The section then builds upon the demonstrated
changes in institutional structures and shows how salient identities for Kosovars shifted in correlation
with these institutional changes. Given the lack of accurate polling data in Kosovo regarding identity, the
politically relevant identities of Kosovars are proxied through the use of election results. Finally, it
evaluates the degree to which examining institutional indicators accurately reflects the politically salient
identities of Kosovar citizens and how regional variations in incentives impact the development of
different politically salient identities. The section as a whole will show how switches in electoral
incentives and the introduction of international interests reshaped the identities promoted by Kosovar
institutions and the ways through which a civic-national identity was semi-successfully promoted.
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The Republic of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on February 17th, 2008. This was
nine years after Kosovo obtained de facto autonomy in the aftermath of the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) intervention against Yugoslavia. This intervention occurred in order to stop ethnic
cleansing committed against Kosovar Albanians. Since then, Kosovo has been recognized by a majority
of United Nations member states but struggles
to achieve recognition from a few key states.
These states include Serbia and Serbian allies
such as Russia along with certain EU member
states, especially those with a fear of
secessionist sentiment such as Spain. A number
of components have led to this struggle. First is
the centrality of Kosovo in the Serbian national
myth, as Kosovo was the location of the 1389
Battle of Kosovo, which took place between
Figure 1: Map of the Western Balkans as of 2018

Serbian and Ottoman forces.70 This battle has

been memorialized in the Serbian national psyche as one of the key beginnings of the Serbian nation and
an expression of their Orthodox Christian identity.71 The second component to Kosovo’s difficulty
obtaining recognition is its struggle to establish an identity that is separate from the ethnic identities of its
citizens but still salient to them. While much progress has been made in this area since 2008, there
remains some portions of this identity formation process where the movement from theoretical actions to
complete implementation have faltered. The institutional structures, however, provide useful examples as
to how to construct a legal regime that allows for the expression of ethnic-based cultural identities while
forming a common civic-national state identity.
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The Development of Kosovar Identity Institutionalization
The three distinct periods of Kosovar institutions resulted in the promotion of three different
types of identities. The first relevant institutional structure was the structure imposed on Kosovo after the
revocation of Kosovar autonomy under Yugoslavia, a change that occurred after the death of Tito, the fall
of Yugoslav communism, the end of the Cold War, and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic. The second
institutional structure came with United Nations Resolution 1244, which created the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo, which was designed to ensure the stability of post-war Kosovo and establish
provisional institutions of self-government. The third institutional structure came with Kosovo’s 2008
declaration of independence, which established new institutions designed by the Kosovar government.
This structure was modified for north Kosovo by the 2013 Brussels Agreement and a heightened
involvement from Serbia in north Kosovo affairs and institutions. This section examines the ways
changing incentives over time and throughout the West Balkan region influenced the development of
different institutional structures and the way these structures institutionalized different types of identities.
Figure 2 shows the three major periods, as well as the alteration to the modern Kosovar institutions that
came with the 2013 Brussels Agreement, as well as the major events leading to the development of new
incentive structures and alternative institutional arrangements.
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Figure 2: Institutional Regimes of Kosovo
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The first regime structure in the era of modern Kosovo is the structure that emerged after the
revocation of Kosovar autonomy within Yugoslavia. Under Tito, Kosovo enjoyed relative autonomy that
was not on par with the constituent republics of Yugoslavia but sufficient to protect the linguistic and
cultural rights of groups in the region. Thus, under Tito, Kosovar institutions followed others within
Yugoslavia in promoting linguistic pluralism and the elimination of ethnic symbol usage.72 The fall of
Yugoslav communism, however, altered the incentives guiding the policies of Yugoslavia towards
Kosovo. Tito’s death opened up a power vacuum within the Yugoslav government which was filled by
Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist leader. The fracturing of Yugoslavia and the resulting
resurgence of openly ethnonationalist political organization meant that in the period leading up to the
Kosovo War, Milosevic was incentivized to promote a Serbian nationalist identity and in doing so, to use
Kosovo’s connection to Serbian history as a rallying point.73 At the time, Kosovo was considered to be
“Old Serbia” by Serbs and the rising ethnonationalist sentiment within Yugoslavia led to resentment
towards the autonomy of two regions within Serbia, Kosovo in the south and Vojvodina in the north.74
The revocation of autonomy for these regions as well as policies that prohibited the use of the Albanian
language in schools and other institutions and otherwise promoted Serbian ethnonationalist interests
within Kosovo thus proved to be electorally and politically profitable for Milosevic, allowing him to
consolidate power within what remained of Yugoslavia post-1995. Thus, the different incentives faced by
Milosevic as compared to Tito contributed to the switch from a policy of autonomy for Kosovo and
general acceptance of varying identities to a new institutional structure that emphasized Serbian
ethnonationalism.
The first incentive was that of the new power vacuum that was filled throughout Yugoslavia’s
republics by ethnonationalist leaders, thus incentivizing Milosevic to become that ethnonationalist leader
for Yugoslav Serbs. The second was the global fall of communism during the post-Cold War era, which
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eliminated the unifying ideology that supported the non-ethnic Yugoslav identity while it existed as a
politically relevant identity. The third was the continuing dissolution of Yugoslavia and the secession of
many of its former republics. This allowed for the Yugoslavia that remained by the beginning of the
Kosovo War in 1998 to be less ethnically heterogeneous than it was during its peak. Yugoslavia could
then be divided between the politically dominant Serbian in-group and the politically excluded Albanian
out-group. It also meant Milosevic no longer needed to appeal to the ideologies of Croats, Bosniaks,
Slovenes, or other constituent Yugoslav nations and could instead rely on a Serbian nationalist ideology
without risking a backlash from other powerful ethnic groups. As the Kosovo myth within Serbian
nationalism remained salient at the time as a political rallying point, by the time the Kosovo War began,
Milosevic had been long incentivized to use the province as a means through which to reinforce the
Serbian nationalist identity around which he hoped to structure the post-Cold War Yugoslav. Finally,
growing unemployment and declining GDP growth increased Serbian resentment towards lesserdeveloped regions and stoked a sense of victimhood, which meant that political appeals relating to myths
of Serbian victimization were popular with the Serbian electorate of the time.75 In the case of Kosovo, the
narrative that Kosovar Albanians stole the land from Serbs and then subjugated them was one such appeal
and one that Milosevic was able to utilize by subjugating Kosovar Albanians in an attempt to prove he
was capable of reclaiming the dignity of Serbs.
The incentives of this transitional period in Yugoslav history led to the institutional arrangements
depicted in Figure 3, which were coded as of 1998 right before the typically accepted beginning of the
Kosovo War and persisted through the duration of the war. The indicators coded for this period all
received a score of -2 for both implementation and official institutional structure, meaning that the
Yugoslav government of the time was solely promoting an ethnonationalist identity within both north and
south Kosovo at the time. The parallel institutions established by Albanians in response similarly
promoted an ethnonationalist Albanian identity, meaning that no major group was promoting a non-ethnic
politically relevant or salient identity in the period preceding and including the Kosovo War. These
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institutional structures persisted throughout the Kosovo War, which meant that by the end of the war in
1999 and the beginning of United Nations oversight, Kosovo had two parallel institutional structures: one
institutional structure that was ethnically Albanian and promoted an Albanian ethnonationalist identity
and the second that was an ethnically Serbian and promoted a Serbian ethnonationalist identity.

Institutional Identity Type Scores in North and South
Kosovo (1998)
0
-0.5
-1
-1.5
-2
-2.5

North Kosovo

South Kosovo

Figure 3:Institutional Identity Type Scores for North and South Kosovo in 1998

The end of the Kosovo War in 1999 brought about a new change in incentives for elites within
Kosovo. First, the area was separated from Serbia and placed under international trusteeship and the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was established under United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1244 following an agreement between Milosevic, Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari,
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and Russian diplomat Viktor Chernomyrdin.76 UNSC Resolution 1244 put authority for establishing
interim self-governing institutions for Kosovo under the authority of UNMIK. This meant that the
incentives surrounding which identity would be most beneficial for elites with the capacity to reshape
Kosovar institutions shifted from what they were under Yugoslavia. The first was that the goals of those
creating the institutions were different from those who built the pre-1999 institutions. Slobodan Milosevic
and other Yugoslav leaders of the time were incentivized by a need to maintain their political position
through appeals that would resonate with voters and the majority of the Yugoslav population. For those
leading the UNMIK construction of new institutions, there were no electoral incentives as they were
appointed by officials at the United Nations. Instead, their incentives came out of a need to comply with
Resolution 1244, prevent a second outbreak of violence, and not lose their own positions. Furthermore, as
Resolution 1244 had no votes against it, compliance with the provisions outlined within Resolution 1244
meant avoiding conflict between major powers with divergent interests in the region while forming
institutions that contradicted Resolution 1244 could mean a resurgence of political conflict between major
powers, something that the UN representatives would have wanted to avoid.
Resolution 1244 contained a few key components. The first was a statement supporting the
continued integrity of what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but with provisions for selfadministration for Kosovo.77 The second component was the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA, UCK in Albanian), which was an Albanian nationalist force established by Ibrahim Rugova
while Kosovo was controlled by Yugoslavia.78 The third component was that an international security
presence would be deployed to the region under the authority of NATO. This would become known as
KFOR.79 The fourth was that UNMIK would be tasked with establishing provisional institutions of selfgovernance with the support of other international organizations.80 This provision introduced another key
stakeholder: the European Union, which was tasked with monitoring the status of the rule of law within
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Kosovo and with supporting the bolstering of Kosovar legal institutions through the European Union Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).81 The inclusion of the European Union introduced another interest
that would affect the shape of the provisional institutions established under UNMIK as the EU openly
stated its interest in assisting rule of law institutions in Kosovo in “on their path towards increased
effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, free from political interference and in full
compliance with EU best practices.”82 This meant that the EU would have an interest in establishing
institutions acceptable under EU standards and ones that supported multi-ethnicity rather than the
dominance of one ethnic group over another. The fifth key provision was that Yugoslav and Serbian
personnel were to be allowed to maintain a presence at Serbian Patrimonial, or religious and cultural
heritage, sites and key border crossings.83 While this provision was never implemented, it codified the
interests of Serbian nationalists under Resolution 1244 by legitimizing their claims to aspects of Kosovo’s
land and history due to their connections to the Serbian national myth. Thus, all institutions developed by
UNMIK would have to balance the competing desires of international stakeholders as well as regional
actors and domestic groups. As a response to the competing interests that UNMIK had to attempt to
satisfy, the provisional institutions established a number of democratic institutions that included reserved
seats and protections for minorities as well as international supervision of institutions that could be used
to perpetuate ethnic violence, such as the Kosovo Police Service.84 The scoring for the institutions
established by UNMIK as they existed just prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 can be
found in Figure 4.
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Figure 4:Institutional Identity Type Scores for North and South Kosovo in 200885

One element of note, when compared to the scores for 1998, is that north Kosovo and South
Kosovo now have diverging identities despite the fact that UNMIK was theoretically in charge of
establishing institutions for the region as a whole. This was due to the fact that many Kosovar Serbs in
Serb-majority north Kosovo boycotted UNMIK institutions, participating instead in Belgrade-led
institutions that continued to promote a Serbian ethnonationalist identity, which then allowed these
institutional structures to be integrated into north Kosovo.86 Another element is that there is a clear divide
between the implementation averages and legal institutional averages for both north and south Kosovo.
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This divergence represents the fact that many of these institutions were created not to actually socialize
citizens into a common identity but, rather to promote stability and avoid a return to violence by granting
representation to the various groups. The limited mandate of UNMIK coupled with the varied interests of
stakeholders meant that short-term stability rather than long-term cohesion was more paramount for those
building the provisional institutions.
One major difference between the situation under Yugoslavia and under UNMIK was the role of
international actors. As demonstrated by the exclusion of the topic of Kosovo from the negotiations that
resulted in the Dayton Accords, international actors had little interest in the region while the situation
remained non-violent and were willing to tolerate non-violent discrimination rather than risking a second
war similar to that in Bosnia.87 Under UNMIK, however, many key stakeholders were international actors
and the institutions created had to cater to the interests of all UNSC members, especially the five
permanent members. Another difference was the changed regional context. By the time of the
establishment of UNMIK institutions, the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian War had been
successful in preventing another outbreak of ethnic violence within Bosnia. As the Dayton Accords
focused on ethnic representation without a common identity as a means through which to reduce violence,
many of UNMIK’s institutions attempted to do the same by focusing on granting representation and
autonomy for minority ethnic groups while doing little to attempt to decrease the divide between different
ethnic communities. This caused a shift in the identity promoted by state institutions, incentivized by the
new entry of international stakeholders in addition to domestic stakeholders as well as the incentive
structures for those shaping the institutions themselves (the electoral incentives under Yugoslavia as
compared to incentives for the non-elected UNMIK officials), contributed to a shift in the identity
promoted by state institutions.
As no accurate polling data related to identity exists for this topic in Kosovo, election results can
serve as proxies for determining what types of political identities were the most accepted by Kosovars.
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The salient identities according to these results can then be compared to those promoted by the UNMIK
institutions to evaluate the effectiveness of institutions in promoting their desired identity. Kosovo held
three parliamentary elections for the provisional institutions between the adoption of UNSC Resolution
1244 and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. All three elections had similar results. The top
two parties were the same across the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections with two explicitly Albanian
nationalist parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)
winning a substantial majority of the vote.88 At the time, both parties called for unification of Albanianmajority territories. In all three elections, Serbian nationalist parties also won a majority of the reserved
minority seats.89 This demonstrates that the salience of ethnic identities as the main means of political
organization remained throughout this transitional period. The continued salience of ethnic identity
combined with the decrease in ethnic violence as compared to the preceding period suggests that the
UNMIK institutions were successful in their goals of preventing violence and promoting stability but
without attempting to reconstruct the salient identities of Kosovar citizens.
The period of time after Kosovo’s declaration of independence represents a stronger shift in the
type of institutions promoted by the Kosovar government. The reliance of Kosovo’s post-2008
government on international actors such as the United States and key European Union member states,
both of which support the identity of Kosovo as a multiethnic state, along with a desire from Kosovar
elites to avoid institutionalizing ethnic cleavages that might lead to later conflict has meant that Kosovar
institutions have shifted towards promoting a new civic-national identity. The next section will explore
with greater detail how this has been done, the differences in institutional structures between north and
south Kosovo, and the degree to which these changes have been successful in promoting the desired
identity.
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The Institutional Construction of Post-2008 Kosovar Identity
The construction of a distinctly Kosovar identity separate from that of an Albanian or Serbian
ethnic identity has been a slow process incentivized by Kosovo’s position in a region often beset by
ethnic violence as well as Kosovo’s dependence on external sponsors for diplomatic and financial
support. However, the process has also been one undertaken purposefully by civil society and Kosovar
government officials. A deeper analysis of the means through which Kosovar elites and their international
backers have used the new state institutions to promote a central Kosovar identity as well as an
examination of the degree to which this identity has become politically meaningful to Kosovars
demonstrates that institutions can contribute to the formation of politically salient non-ethnic identities
and societal shifts that allow them to remain salient across ethnic divides. This analysis also demonstrates
that institutional structures alone are insufficient to explain the key identities within a state but become
more meaningful as an indicator of politically relevant identities when paired with indicators showing the
divides between institutional arrangements and their actual implementations. The overall nature of
Kosovar institutions is depicted in Figure 5 while Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the average combined
scores divided into north and south Kosovo in 2018 as compared to in 1999.
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Figure 6:Map depicting the combined average scores for north Kosovo and south Kosovo (1998)

Figure 7: Map depicting the combined average scores for north Kosovo and south Kosovo (2018)91
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The scores above demonstrate that a clearer divergence has emerged since 2008 between north
Kosovo and south Kosovo in terms of the identities promoted by the institutions relevant to each region.
It also demonstrates Kosovo’s stark departure from the ethnonationalist identity institutionalized while
Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia to the civic-national identity of modern Kosovo. Within south Kosovo,
which is ruled solely by the central Kosovar government and regional bodies authorized by Kosovo’s
constitution, there has been both the institutionalization of a civic-national identity and active attempts to
socialize citizens into this new identity. Within north Kosovo, which is ruled partially by institutions
governed by the central Kosovar government, partially by regional autonomous institutions, and partially
by Serbian institutions, there has been a lack of cohesion in the identity promoted by the state. This
section will examine first how this civic-national identity has been promoted in south Kosovo and the
degree to which it has been effective before examining the case of north Kosovo.
One important way the Kosovar government led the construction of a new civic-national identity
has been by outlining the specific values and norms that would shape the Kosovar identity, which then
allows institutions to promote it successfully. The constitution of Kosovo states that the state identity
would be founded upon a commitment to values such as liberal democracy and multiethnic existence. The
Kosovar identity would also draw upon Kosovars’ shared experiences as an additional unifying factor
while not seeking to eliminate sympathies for ethnic or cultural connections. Instead, the central Kosovar
identity, through its more inclusive nature, would seek to allow individual community identities to
flourish while also connecting Kosovars across ethnic and cultural lines. This has been done in a number
of key ways. The first way has been through the construction of inclusive institutions. The second way
has been through the constitutional institutionalization of specific protections for ethnic minorities. The
third way has been through the establishment of non-ethnic state symbols and finally, through intensive
efforts to further Kosovo’s integration into Euro-Atlantic international institutions such as NATO and the
European Union.
Other factors have, however, slowed the process of non-ethnic identity formation. This slowing is
clearest in the case of the semi-autonomous and Serb-majority north Kosovo but is also present
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throughout the remainder of the state. Despite the active efforts of the Kosovar government and other
actors, the experiences of Kosovar Albanians during Yugoslavia and especially the Yugoslav
government’s attempts at ethnic cleansing in 1999 have solidified the importance of ethnic identity for
ethnic Albanians within Kosovo. Albin Kurti, the leader of the Kosovo’s Albanian nationalist party
Vetëvendosje! (Self-determination), stated that “Our [Kosovar Albanian] nationalism is a reaction to
oppression by Milosevic and war with the Serbs.”92 The frequent use of the Albanian flag by Kosovar
Albanians similarly demonstrates the continued sentimental connections between Kosovar Albanians and
the Albanian ethnic identity.93 While the government of Kosovo has attempted to take steps to remedy the
continued adherence to ethnonationalism, flaws in institutional arrangement, the inability of Kosovar
institutions to exert sovereignty over the entire state due to special arrangements for north Kosovo, and
the unwillingness of politicians to break with the support they gain through nationalist mobilization have
prevented the emergence of a separate and salient Kosovar identity.94
While implementation has been limited in its success, Kosovar institutions have made concerted
efforts to develop a non-ethnic central identity. One key way has been through their actions in regard to
language. Under Yugoslavia and prior to the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo, perceived and
actual linguistic repression was one of the main offenses that led to the development of a strong affinity
towards their ethnic identity amongst Yugoslav Albanians.95 Throughout most of Yugoslavia’s existence
the state supported a policy of linguistic pluralism, which allowed and at times encouraged linguistic
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diversity.96 However, post-1980, the policy towards the Albanian language within Kosovo moved to what
would be considered a centralist policy.
A centralist policy is one where “national security and national unity are linked with a dominant
language, and the dominant ethno-linguistic group sustains its control of political and economic power by
rationalizing the exclusion of other languages from public domains, particularly education.”97 Under
Milosevic, state schools within Kosovo ceased teaching in the Albanian language and imposed a
curriculum that, according to a witness at Milosevic’s trial at the International Criminal Court, eliminated
the history of the Albanian people.98 The government of Yugoslavia also shut down Albanian language
schools in all sectors of the educational system, including primary education, secondary education, and
higher education through the Albanian-language University of Pristina.99 All Albanian faculty members at
the University of Pristina were fired and the government stopped paying Albanian teachers at other
institutions.100 Worsening the dilemma, Albanian students who did graduate universities struggled to find
jobs as most Albanians were fired and replaced by Serbs from other parts of Yugoslavia.101 In response to
this discrimination, Albanian students and professors began a boycott of state schools and set up parallel
educational institutions that taught in the Albanian language and with a more Albanian nationalist
curriculum.102 This led to a growing separation between Serbian and Albanian youth, both due to de facto
segregation in the school systems and due to starkly different curriculum. The separation continued into
the modern day as the educational system in south Kosovo and north Kosovo remain separate as the north
Kosovo system continues to follow standards issues by Belgrade while the south Kosovo system adheres
to a curriculum implemented by the central government in Pristina. Thus, textbooks and lessons taken by
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Serbian students in the north reject basic premises taught in schools throughout the rest of the state,
including Kosovo’s independence and the multiethnic nature of the state.103 Students throughout Kosovo
are then socialized into two separate identities, one Serbian, one Kosovar, leading to continued divisions
throughout two portions of the state.
The government of Kosovo has sought to remedy both the linguistic disparities that led to this
division and the issue of ethno-nationalist rhetoric in education. The curriculum standards issued by the
Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology include a section on “civic competence.”104 The
standards state that the goal of secondary education with regard to civic competence under the Kosovar
system should include the following. First, that students should “practice civic rights and obligations in
concrete situations.”105 Second, that students should “through different forms of expression, reacts to
persons who in any way violate, impinge, or deny the rights of others”106 and that teachers should educate
students on “consequences of these actions for the individual, the group, and the community.”107 Third,
that students should “identify prejudices or bad phenomena in class”108 and adopt a stance against them.
Fourth, that students should take part in classes and activities that promote and respect ethnic and cultural
diversity.109 These, along with other standards issued by the ministry, have developed into a curriculum
that attempts to promote the idea of ethnic and cultural diversity, which is supported by coexistence
programs funded and implemented by the government of Kosovo along with foreign aid groups and
governments. This curriculum has only been implemented in south Kosovo. The lack of universal
implementation is one aspect negatively affecting integration of north Kosovo’s population into the
broader state as the educational system has been one area largely successful in integrating the non-
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Albanian population of south Kosovo. Groups such as Kosovo’s Turkish, Bosniak, and other smaller
ethnic communities have been highly accepting of the educational system implemented in the south.110
Language-specific rights are another area in which, at least on paper, the government of Kosovo
has done admirably. The Law on the Use of Languages, passed by the Assembly of Kosovo in 2006, is
designed to ensure that the two official languages, Albanian and Serbian, are used equally throughout the
state.111 It also ensures that languages spoken by at least three percent of the population are considered
“languages in official use” and that citizens speaking one of these languages can get documents written in
them upon official request.112 Also under this law, languages spoken by at least five percent of the
population are to be considered official languages of the municipalities where the demographic fulfill this
requirement.113 These laws then cover the protection of both the languages of the majority and the largest
minority as well as those of smaller grouping that nonetheless have legitimate claims to the protection of
their linguistic rights. This has then pushed the typology of language rights in Kosovo back towards that
of linguistic pluralism, a category that was met with success when implemented in Yugoslavia until
central institutions ceased promoting it.
While the legislation on languages in Kosovo is comprehensive, the implementation has been
lacking. Bilingualism has been declining in Kosovo and translations from Albanian to Serbian and
Serbian to Albanian are often rife with spelling and grammatical errors.114 While 89% of municipal
officers consider communication in both languages to be important, only 20% use both in their everyday
work-related activities, even in ethnically mixed areas.115 A key issue here has been a lack of bilingual
education. It was terminated within schools in Kosovo in 1989 and has struggled to make a resurgence.
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Since then, most translators, especially those working in north Kosovo, have come from the Albanian
language department at Belgrade University.116
There are some elements that indicate movement towards a civic-national identity. First, while
bilingualism has been declining, government employees still see linguistic diversity as an important
value. Second, the government of Kosovo has remained committed to its promises to provide information
in both languages and has made no legislative attempts to elevate one language over the other. There has
been some progress in implementation of greater bilingualism throughout the state as well. New programs
in both Serbian and Albanian have been introduced in Kosovar primary and secondary schools and
courses on Serbian have been reintroduced into Albanian-language universities. Albanian language
programs have also been introduced on RTK2, the state-run Serbian television station, with Serbian
language programs to launch later on RTK1, RTK2’s Albanian equivalent.117 However, the separate
educational systems and separate governmental procedures operating in north Kosovo and south Kosovo
have led to a delayed implementation of many of these programs.
The government of the Republic of Kosovo has also made concerted efforts to recognize the
rights of minority ethnic groups, often through institutional protections. In its constitution, Kosovo
defines its constituent ethnic and cultural groupings as distinct “communities” that are given special rights
and protections under Kosovar law.118 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states that “the
Republic of Kosovo ensures appropriate conditions enabling communities, and their members to preserve,
protect and develop their identities. The Government shall particularly support cultural initiatives from
communities and their members, including through financial assistance.”119 By officially attempting to
preserve and protect the identities of various ethnic communities within its borders, the government of
Kosovo has been attempting to foster a policy of specific polyethnic rights as defined by Kymlicka.120
Kosovo similarly grants special representation rights to its minority communities, providing 20 reserved
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seats for minority ethnic communities and mandating that constitutional amendments must be passed by
both a 2/3rds majority of the entire parliament and a 2/3rds majority of the special reserved seats.121 It
also grants special group differentiated rights as defined by Kymlicka to its minority communities, stating
that special funding and assistance will be given to promote the cultural identities of minority
communities and that that special assistance “will not be considered discrimination”122 even if the
majority group is not granted it. As such, the structure of the Kosovar government acknowledges the fact
that cultural identity provides an “anchor for [people’s] self-identification and the safety of effortless
secure belonging.”123 The government of Kosovo has By not seeking to assimilate its minority groups into
the central identity and instead attempting to position Kosovar identity as one that can be held in tandem
with ethnic cultural identities, the Kosovar government is pursuing a more plausible central non-ethnic
identity than one that would seek to erase the identities of individual ethnic groups.
Kosovo’s national museum similarly incorporates the national myths of different states. Part of it
is dedicated to the history of Dardania, the ancient name for the area Kosovo now occupies, and contains
artifacts from Roman and Greek eras in an attempt to legitimize the modern independent Kosovar state as
a separate entity from both Albania and Serbia.124 It also contains items from the Kosovo Liberation
Army (UÇK) as well as Albanian artifacts and memorabilia from Albanian history alongside items both
relating to the Kosovo War.125 Thus, Kosovo’s continued construction of its own national myth
incorporates a mix of respect for the individual ethnic and cultural communities within its borders, a
mixing and synchronism of identities from both its kin-state Albania as well as non-kin but ideologically
affiliated states and international institutions, as well as its own new but historically legitimized identity.
While this has proven effective with regard to minority ethnic groups in south Kosovo, including south
Kosovo’s Serbian minority, it has not been as useful in integrating Serbian-majority north Kosovo.126
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Other forms of national symbols have also worked to establish a Kosovar identity separate from
that of Albania or Serbia. National sports teams and sports victories have played a major role in forming a
cohesive identity for citizens of the state. In 2016, Kosovo was granted full FIFA membership. Kosovo
also gained membership in the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the European soccer
federation, and competed in the 2018 UEFA Nations League. During this time, Kosovo’s national team
won four of its six matches and tied two. These victories, combined with the growth in matched played in
Pristina rather than outside of the state (where Kosovars would have trouble traveling to see due to the
EU’s harsh visa regime), has led to an upswing in emotional affiliation with Kosovo rather than greater
Albania.127 The Kosovar national team has even acquired its own ultras group, a group of intense fans
associated in the European soccer context with strong national pride.128 The name of the ultras group is
Dardanët, or Dardanians, referring to a tribe of ancient Illyrians that once inhabited Kosovo’s current
territory, repeating the inferred claim of continuity made by Kosovo’s national museum.129 Kosovo’s
participation in other international sporting events has also depended the Kosovar cohesive identity. Judo
competitions have been another source of national pride for Kosovo and one in which the state has been
able to win tacit victories with the Kosovar flag being raised in states not yet recognizing its
independence.130 Kosovo’s recent inaugural competition in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics similarly
brought out a sense of national pride amongst the Kosovar population and a growing affiliation with the
civic-national symbols of the state, symbols which have struggled to gain acceptance. The reputational
benefits to Kosovo from these successes also might have assisted in increasing the salience of the national
identity by increasing the social status of the state.131
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Another indicator of the development of a national myth in south Kosovo and the ways in which
people are socialized into this myth comes in the form of the flags used throughout the state. Flags hold a
special place in the political and social consciousness of Kosovars. This comes first through the
importance of the Albanian flag as a symbol of national identity under the later years of Yugoslavia and
then through the use of various flags to symbolize the national ambitions of Kosovars in their newly
independent state.132 Albania’s national day, which is also celebrated by Kosovar Albanians and takes
place on Albanian independence day, is called Flag Day in honor of the Albanian flag and its central
place in Albanian cultural identity.133 In general, national symbols take on an important role in state and
identity building as they become “modern totems as they merge the mythical sacredness of the nation into
forms experienced by sight and sound by blending of subject and object beyond simple representations of
nations. In a very real sense, national symbols become the nation.”134 Kosovo’s current flag, a yellow
outline of the state on a blue background with six white stars symbolizing the constituent cultural groups,
was created under strict rules imposed by the United Nations that prevented any Serbian or Albanian
national symbols from being incorporated into the flag.135 This had led to a situation where postindependence, the official flag of Kosovo is respected by its population but not held to the same
emotional esteem as the Albanian flag.136
A 2019 study which found that among younger cohorts of Kosovar Serb and Kosovar Albanian
children in south Kosovo there was a greater affiliation with the Kosovar flag as compared to ethnic flags
and a declining affiliation with ethnic flags between grade cohorts lends credence to the argument that the
Kosovar identity is salient among some portions of Kosovo’s population alongside the ethnic identities of
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Kosovar citizens.137 It further found that association with the Kosovar flag was correlated with less
interest in separation between groups and greater pro-sociality, demonstrating the growing success over
time in institutionalizing and promoting the Kosovar identity.138 Thus, while the movement towards a
civic-national Kosovar identity has been imperfect and harmful ethnonational sentiment remains, civicnational institutions have had some successes in promoting the growth of a salient civic-national Kosovar
identity, which is then correlated with decreases in ethnic violence and increased pro-social attitudes
between Serbs and Albanians within south Kosovo. Furthermore, this process has been done in a way that
allows Kosovar citizens to have attachments to both their ethnic and cultural identities as well as their
state identity with limited conflict between the two. This allows for pride in one’s ethnic identity and
pride in one’s state identity, with the state identity allowing for the development of emotional connections
between different ethnic groups. This also demonstrates that the development of attitudes of hybrid
nationalism in the minds of citizens can successfully preserve the ability of individuals to emotionally
affiliate with multiple groups without being forced to give one attachment up in favor of another.

Identity in North Kosovo
There has been some progress in the formation of a Kosovar identity. This success is, however,
largely limited to areas of Kosovo south of Southern Mitrovica. From Northern Mitrovica upwards, the
shift in majority ethnicity along with the continued massive influence of the Serbian government has
prevented the formation of a unified identity across the Ibar River Bridge. This section will examine the
effects of different incentives implemented by the Brussels Agreement and the presence of Serbian
government influence on institutions within north Kosovo and then on how those have affected the most
salient identities within the region.
The Brussels Agreement was concluded in 2013 between the prime ministers of Serbia and
Kosovo and under the auspices of the High Representative of the European Union in an attempt to form a
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framework to resolve ongoing disputes between Serbia and Kosovo.139 It was supposed to replace the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, also known as the Ahtisaari Plan. The
Ahtisaari Plan, which was developed in 2007, was designed to transition Kosovo into a place where it
could exist as a stable, multi-ethnic, and independent state, but was rejected by Serbia for this exact
reason. This led to its replacement. The Brussels Agreement made greater concessions to Serbian
interests in order to obtain the agreement of the Serbian government.
One major concession that distinguished the Brussels Agreement from the Ahtisaari Plan was the
demand that the government of Kosovo create the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM).140 The
ASM would have “full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural
planning.”141 It would also be permitted special rights in regards to the creation of its police force and
additional areas of autonomy.142 The ASM was thus supposed to create a form of group-differentiated
citizenship for what would be a minority Serb nation in Kosovo. In theory, this would allow for selfdetermination for both the Serb minority and Albanian majority and would make membership in the
Kosovar state more palatable for Serbs. However, in practice, this agreement allowed for infringement on
Kosovar sovereignty by the Serbian government. While the ASM has not yet been fully implemented, the
situation in north Kosovo already mirrors much of what the Brussels Agreement envisaged for the
organization in the level of autonomy allowed for the region due to the refusal of north Kosovar
institutions to participate in the broader state institutions.
The Brussels Agreement text was designed to allow Kosovar Serbs autonomy over welfare
systems and the educational system, however, control over these areas ended up in the hands of Belgrade,
giving the Serbian government ultimate control over these portions of north Kosovo’s governance
structure.143 As such, the educational system of north Kosovo uses the Serbian curriculum and is in no
ways integrated into the educational system of the rest of the state. This has prevented the socialization of
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citizens of north Kosovo into the Kosovar identity and prevented inter-ethnic exchanges between Serbian
and Albanian students. The divergence in welfare structures, the lack of taxes paid by north Kosovo to the
Kosovar government, and the rejection of civic national symbols has then prevented integration of north
Kosovo into the Kosovar state as a whole.
This has been problematic both for the development of a Kosovar identity as well as for the
stability of the state and region. The dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over sovereignty over the north
has led to a degree of lawlessness in the region with police having limited powers there.144 This
lawlessness has led to the assassination of politicians promoting integration, journalists, and other
members of the north Kosovar community, which has further cemented ethnic divisions in the region.145 It
has also led to institutional dysfunction, with the establishment of parallel healthcare and educational
systems that divide Serbs and Albanians and produce inefficiencies and unnecessary overlap, increasing
costs and worsening educational and health outcomes.146 The developing but positive signs of integration
of Serbs in south Kosovo into the common Kosovar identity shows that under the system of laws and
institutions developed by the central Kosovar government, inter-ethnic reconciliation and the formation of
a common identity is possible, if slow.147 Thus, the problems in north Kosovo can be seen as arising not
because of primordial hatreds between Albanians and Serbs but rather due to a lack of institutional
socialization and malign foreign influence.
One key issue with forming the ASM is the influence of the institutional structure of neighboring
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War, set up a structure highly
dependent on ethnic identities and one that allowed for Serbian autonomy through the creation of the
Republika Srpska (RS). This autonomous entity, along with Bosnia’s tripartite presidency where each
president (one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb) holds veto power over any decision, has largely stymied
Bosnia’s attempts to join the European Union and NATO as well as Bosnian attempts to reform Dayton
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and create a non-ethnic Bosnian identity. The election of Milorad Dodik, a self-styled Serbian nationalist,
first as the head of the RS and now the Serbian member of the Bosnian presidency has only worsened the
situation.148 He has repeatedly stated his desire to win independence or annexation to Serbia for the RS,
refused to travel using his Bosnian passport, rejected any emotional attachment to Bosnia, and refused to
attend meetings where the flag of the Republika Srpska is not displayed.149 Throughout this, he has been
backed by his patron, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic along with the Russian government. The
continued influence of the Serbian government on Bosnian affairs through the RS and Dodik especially as
well as the existing manipulations of Serbia in north Kosovo led to concerns that creating an autonomous
Serbian community in north Kosovo would only allow for greater dependency on Belgrade and would
further reduce the possibility for the establishment of a common Kosovar identity.
Another key problem is that Serbia has no interest in the success of Kosovo’s state project.
Rather, it has an interest in seeing it fail in order to bolster the rationale that its population would be better
off as citizens of Serbia.150 Serbia’s manipulation of Serbs in north Kosovo has extended into intimidation
of Serbs who seek to join the Kosovar police force or the Kosovo Security Forces, now the Kosovo
Army.151 Belgrade has also used the Serb List, a political party of Kosovar Serbs, in order to further its
own goals, using them and the constitutional mandate that constitutional changes pass a supermajority of
the reserved seats for minority communities (50% of which are reserved for Serbs) to restrict changes that
would allow for the development of Kosovo’s statehood and identity.152
The Brussels Agreement also combined with other geopolitical factors to alter the incentives for
Serbian elites and general citizens within north Kosovo. Prior to the 2013 agreement, the dominant Serb
political party within Kosovo was the Independent Liberal Party (SLS), which won a plurality of the
reserved Serb seats in the 2007 Kosovar parliamentary elections and an outright majority of the reserved
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Serb seats in the 2010 elections.153 Unlike the Serbian List, the SLS is focused on the integration of Serbs
into Kosovar society and the acceptance of Kosovar independence by Serbs and eventually, the Serbian
government.154 Its leader, Slobodan Petrović, was born in south Kosovo and often conflicts with Belgrade
over its policies towards Kosovo.155 The SLS uses mainly symbols relating to the EU and a broader
European identity as well as symbols evoking the civic-national symbols of the Kosovar state, further
demonstrating its political ideology in regards to the position of Serbs within Kosovo. The 2014 Kosovar
parliamentary elections, however, marked a sharp shift in the dominant Serb political party within the
state. The SLS lost all of its seats in the 2014 elections and the majority Serb party became the Serb
List.156 In contrast to the SLS, the Serb List rejects Kosovo’s independence and is strongly backed by the
Serbian government.157
Prior to the 2013 agreement, Serb elites within Kosovo, especially within south Kosovo, were
incentivized to advocate for involvement in Kosovar society in order to gain power within the state,
especially since no opportunities were available for participation in the Serbian government and the
Serbian government would not support Serb politicians participating in Kosovar institutions. The Brussels
Agreement shifted these incentives. Now, instead of benefitting from the boycotting of Kosovar
institutions, the Serbian government was incentivized to support the involvement of Serbian nationalist
politicians in the Kosovar government in order to ensure outcomes beneficial to the Serbian state, such as
the formation of the ASM. The Serbian government then shifted its own actions due to these incentives
and began supporting the Serb List politicians while intimidating and coercing members of the SLS and
their voter base in north Kosovo. This intimidation assisted in the fragmentation of Serbian political
society within Kosovo where Serbs within south Kosovo proceeded with some degrees of integration
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while institutions within north Kosovo were incentivized to maintain parallel institutional structures
rather than ones integrated with the rest of the state.158 The switch in dominant Serb political parties
within north Kosovo demonstrate how the changed incentives due to the Brussels Agreement and a switch
in the Serbian government’s approach to Kosovo altered the salient identities of north Kosovo and thus
reinforced the ethnonationalist institutional structures.

Conclusion
The case of Kosovo demonstrates that different electoral incentives, combined with the impact of
reliance on international actors, influence the identity types political elites find it most beneficial to shape
institutions to promote. Within south Kosovo, a post-2008 incentive to promote a civic-national identity
led to institutional structures that sought to both prevent an outbreak of ethnonationalist violence and to
socialize citizens into a common Kosovar identity. The affiliation of Kosovars with external non-kin
states as well as political acceptance of political parties promoting a civic-national identity demonstrate
that this socialization process has been at least partially effective. In contrast, the case of north Kosovo
and the change between salient identities pre-Brussels Agreement and post-Brussels Agreement, which
were not correlated with demographic shifts or economic shifts, demonstrate the impact of altered
incentives relating to investment from kin-states promoting an ethnonationalist identity. The following
section on Israel and the West Bank will take these results and see how incentive changes altered the
institutional structures of the two regions as well as how the various proposals for a solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict might influence new, or reinforce existing, institutional structures regarding salient
identities.
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Chapter Three: The State of Israel and the West Bank
Despite the focus on a two-state solution as the best remedy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the institutional structures of the State of Israel and the institutions of the West Bank remain closely
intertwined. A number of structural and political changes have led to the decreasing likelihood of a twostate solution. These include the lack of territorial contiguity of areas of the West Bank under Palestinian
civil or military control, the frequent discussions coming from the Israeli government regarding full
annexation of the West
Bank, the increasing pace
of Jewish settlement
building within the West
Bank, and decreasing
interest from Arab states in
continuing to isolate Israel,
largely due to a greater
perceived threat from

Figure 8: Map of the Middle East as of 2018

Iran.159
These shifts all

demonstrate a movement away from a situation where the two-state solution could be feasible.
Furthermore, the rising heterogeneity of the Israeli population, coming from increased migration from the
former Soviet Union, increased immigration from African states, and demographic trends pointing
towards Arabs representing a larger proportion of the Israeli population means that a two-state solution
would still fail to resolve the question of the position of non-Jews and non-Ashkenazi Jews within the
broader Israeli state. The presence of a large Arab population within Israel’s pre-1967 borders along with
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the growing Jewish population in the West Bank also complicates the exact territorial division that would
occur in a two-state solution. This uncertainty increases the likelihood of population displacement, ethnic
violence, or forced migration in the case of a solution imposing what would functionally be an ethnicbased partition. Not only does this plan rely on an agreement between the Israeli government and
Palestinian Authority, it ignores the implications for Arab Israelis and non-Jewish and non-Arab citizens
of Israel that are often ignored in discussions of status and identity. Thus, the changing domestic and
international incentives promoting a two-state solution legitimize a discussion over the ways institutions
in Israel and the West Bank have promoted specific identities over time and the ways incentives could be
shaped under a one-state solution that would encourage institutions supporting a civic-national identity
rather than a ethnonational one.
This section will first trace the developments of the institutional structures in the West Bank in
order to examine the varying incentives shaping the types of identities promoted by institutional
structures within the West Bank and Gaza and how they have shifted over time. It will then examine
Israeli President Reuven Rivlin’s proposal to annex the West Bank and provide all its residents with full
and equal Israeli citizenship and how it along with other shifting incentives, may shape future institutional
structures. Finally, it will examine alternative proposals for annexing the West Bank, including those with
a more ethnonationalist leaning, in order to demonstrate how the official nature of the annexation, either
civic-national or ethnonational, assists in determining the resulting character of new or maintained state
institutions.

The Institutionalization of Israeli and Palestinian Identity
The 1948 War ended with Israel and the West Bank split into two fully separate institutional
regimes. While this separation continued while the West Bank was under Jordanian control, the Israeli
victory in the 1967 War and the resulting occupation of the West Bank brought the two systems back into
contact with each other. This section will examine the development of institutions within the State of
Israel (defined as the territory within Israel’s pre-1967 borders) and the West Bank along with the
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changes in incentives that caused alterations in institutional structures. Figure 9 shows the major periods
of distinct institutional regimes for both Israel and the West Bank along with major events or changes.
The first post-mandate institutional regimes were established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, post-Israeli
independence and while the West Bank was under Jordanian control. The Israeli institutional regime was
then altered in 1966 with the removal of military governance over Israeli Arabs. The 1967 Arab-Israeli
War led to another shift in the institutional structures of the West Bank after its occupation by Israel. The
third major institutional shift came with the 1993 Oslo Accords, which allowed for limited selfgovernment by Palestinians but continued the interconnected nature of Israeli and Palestinian institutions.
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Figure 9: Institutional Regimes of Israel and the West Bank
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The first period for both Israel and the West Bank began with the end of the British Mandate on
May 14th, 1948 and the beginning of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This, however, did not mean that the
impact of the British control over Mandatory Palestine had no effect on the later institutional structures of
the state.160 The British had two main goals during their period of control over the region. The first was to
prevent an outbreak of conflict between ethnic groups. The second was to maintain British control over
the territory. This led to the imposition of institutions that separated Arabs and Jews while giving each
group incentives, which were often conflicting, to cooperate with the British government.161 An example
of these incentives is the contrast between the Balfour Declaration, which promised the establishment of a
Jewish national home in Palestine, and the McMahon-Hussein compromise, which promised Arabs
independence as a reward for collaboration with the British.162 One example of the means through which
British intuitional structures divided the groups within Mandatory Palestine was the establishment of a
divided economy in which the two main ethnic groupings of the region (Palestinian Arabs and Jews)
operated in distinct economic sectors with little overlap. This dual economy lessened interactions between
members of two groups and removed economic incentives for cooperation.163 The imposition of these
divisive structures combined with the offering of conflicting promises to Arabs and Jews established the
groundwork for inter-ethnic distrust within the region and pre-established parallel and divided
institutions.
The end of the 1948 War left the West Bank and Israel in two completely separate institutional
regimes, one Israeli and one Jordanian. For the Israeli government, a number of incentives went into the
construction of an institutional regime that centralized a Jewish national identity. First, there were the
circumstances of the immigration of most Jews into what became Israel. Many of those who moved prior
to the beginning of the 1948 War did so explicitly in order to be a citizen of the Jewish nation-state or in
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order to escape anti-Semitism, even though this was not applicable to all Jews who immigrated.164 This
laid the groundwork for the ideological foundations of the Israeli state and meant that Jewish political
leaders would be incentivized to adhere to Zionist nation-statist ideology in order to maintain political
support. While Zionism was not always founded on the assumption that it would lead to the creation of a
Jewish nation-state, by the time Israeli institutions were established beginning in 1948, existing Yishuv
political institutions were primed to transition into state institutions promoting a Jewish ethnic identity as
the main politically relevant identity within the Israeli state.165
The historical circumstances propelling immigration into what became Israel during the Ottoman
period and then the British Mandate also set the basis for an easy appeal to Jewish nationalism by later
Israeli leaders. For example, the first aliyah, which took place between 1882 and 1903, occurred due to
pogroms in Tsarist Russia and other areas of Eastern Europe.166 The fifth mass aliyah occurred during the
rise of fascism in Europe. In this case, immigration quotas in the US restricted Jews from transatlantic
immigration and European immigration quotas also restricted the choices for Jews fleeing persecution,
leading to 47% of Jews emigrating from Europe choosing to go to Palestine.167 This meant that for a
majority of the Jews residing in the region by the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, the
salience of their Jewish ethno-religious identity had been heightened either due to the conscious choice to
migrate in order to fulfill Zionist ambitions or due to being forced to migrate in order to flee anti-Semitic
violence.168 This affiliation was further strengthened by the formation of the Irgun and Haganah, Jewish
paramilitary organizations that remained politically powerful after the establishment of the State of Israel
by forming the basis for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and by propelling the political careers of many of
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their members and leaders.169 Later Israeli prime ministers and political leaders, such as Menachem
Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, Moshe Dayan, and others all had careers begun as part of
paramilitary organizations.170
The salience of the Jewish-Arab divide arising from conflict over the UN partition and the 1948
Arab-Israeli War incentivized the implementation of parallel legal systems for Arabs and non-Arabs
within Israel. While Israeli Arabs were given citizenship, they were also placed under military rule, which
then imposed restrictions on the freedom of speech, movement, and expression of Israeli Arabs in
addition to other rights.171 This led to the over-criminalization of Israeli Arab actions, lessening their
desire to form an emotional affiliation with the state. The imposition of different legal regimes for Arabs
and non-Arabs began the formation of parallel institutional systems of governance for non-Arab citizens
of Israel and Arab citizens of Israel. Furthermore, during this period, the Israeli government dealt with
individual tribal leaders and authorities rather than any collective Arab representation.172 This decision
was part of an attempt to prevent the emergence of a unified Israeli Arab identity as a serious political
concern.173 The imposition of military rule also allowed the Israeli government to better constrain and
monitor the non-Zionist Israeli Communist Party and to incentivize Israeli Arabs to instead vote for
Mapai, the most powerful Israeli political party of the time.174 During the period of institutional
construction immediately after the 1948 War, Israeli leaders found themselves faced with a number of
pressures and possibilities. These competing pressures included the desire to fulfill Zionist promises and
thus maintain their political power and concerns over the potential ramifications of a large and politically
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equal Arab population. Combined, these factors led to the creation of an ethnonational institutional
regime that both actively prioritized Jewish identity and systemically and explicitly discriminated against
Israeli Arabs.
While the Jordanian monarchy lacked the electoral incentives faced by Israeli leaders in deciding
how to shape their institutions, concerns for regime stability and continuity also underpinned their
decisions regarding the institutional structure of the West Bank. Prior to the annexation of the West Bank,
the main politically relevant identity of the Jordanian population was the Bedouin identity that
underpinned the Jordanian national identity and symbols and played a role in legitimizing the Hashemite
monarchy.175 The annexation of the West Bank appealed to the Jordanian monarchy due to both the new
territory it would acquire and due to the fact that control over a unified Jerusalem would increase the
religious legitimacy of the monarchy.176 This annexation, however, would bring with it a large Palestinian
Arab population whose major politically relevant identity would be distinct from that of “ethnic
Jordanians” and whose population size would be nearly equal to that of East Bank Jordanians.
The Jordanian desire to incorporate Palestinian Arabs into the broader state led the Jordanian
government to grant full citizenship to Palestinians, something not done in other Arab states, where
Palestinians were often denied citizenship on the grounds that that would risk removing their Palestinian
national identity.177 This denial of citizenship was often due to a desire to ensure the stay of Palestinian
refugees in their host states remained as temporary as possible.178 In the Jordanian case, the incorporation
of extra territory along with the absorption of Palestinians meant that some of the concerns faced by other
Arab states were not felt as strongly in Jordan, or at least that the incentives of obtaining extra territory
and control over Jerusalem’s holy sites were significant enough to overcome concerns about
incorporating the extra population. In order to further incorporate the West Bank into the Jordanian state,
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the Jordanian government simply extended East Bank institutions into the newly annexed territory on a
piecemeal basis.179 This allowed for the Jordanian government, through a combination of institutional
integration and the granting of equal citizenship, coupled with appeals to a broader pan-Arab identity, to
attempt to overcome the divides between the Palestinian Arab identity and the Hashemite or Bedouin
identity held by a majority of East Bank Jordanians at the time.180 Thus, the desire to integrate the West
Bank into the Jordanian state without conflict between the nearly equally sized groups led the Jordanian
government to create an institutional regime that emphasized a common Arab Muslim identity within the
West Bank. These structures would eventually prove insufficient to suppress tensions between
Palestinians and ethnic Jordanians, which culminated in the Black September conflict.181 While the
conflict ended with a continuation of the Hashemite monarchy, it also established deep distrust between
Palestinians and ethnic Jordanians within Jordan.182 The failure of these institutions to remove or diminish
tensions between Palestinians and ethnic Jordanians demonstrate how one level of shared ethnic identity
can be insufficient to establish unity in the face of other obstacles.
In the case of both Israel and the West Bank during this period, a desire to maintain legitimacy
and the presence of a population with an existing common ethnic identity that could become, or already
was, politically salient led to the construction of ethnonationalist institutions. For the Israeli government,
this choice allowed them to continue to hold the support of their population and potentially to continue
receiving support, political and financial, from members of the Jewish diaspora. The need for diaspora
support in the early stages of state-building was also salient during the late 1990s in Kosovo as Kosovar
Albanians relied partially on support from the Albanian diaspora in order to fund the KLA. For the
Jordanian government, the choice to create institutions promoting an Arab ethnonationalist identity
allowed them to attempt to bridge the divide between Palestinian Arabs and Bedouin Arabs and to remain
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united with other states in the Arab world that were displeased with Jordan’s decision to annex the West
Bank. The choices of both governments resulted in the following indicator scores as of 1966, which was
after the formal Jordanian annexation of the West Bank but prior to the Israeli elimination of military rule
of Israeli Arabs. These scores are depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Institutional Identity Type Scores for Israel and the West Bank as of 1952

A change in the Israeli institutional structure came at the end of 1966 with the removal of military
rule over Israeli Arabs. Repeated inquiries related to corruption and other concerns, starting in 1949 and
reemerging frequently throughout the duration of the military government, began to make its continuance
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a political liability to the Israeli government.183 The emergence of Jewish-Arab organizations opposing
the military government led to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion acceding to a series of haqalot (alleviations)
concerning restrictions on Israeli Arabs and by the time Ben-Gurion retired and new Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol took over, the continuation of the military government was both too politically damaging and
unnecessary with respect to security to be continued.184 The new legal equality of citizenship between
Israeli Arabs and Jews led to a divergence between the official structure of institutions and their practical
implementations. While Israeli institutions continued to keep their Jewish character, the legal equality of
Arabs led to an increasingly non-ethnic nature of some institutions. The practical implementation of some
policies, however, led to a continued divide between ethnic groups. This is demonstrated, for example, by
the persistent gap in education spending for Jewish and Arab citizens. These divides have been
exemplified by the fact that the Israeli government spends an average of $192 per year per Arab student
and an average of $1,100 per year per Jewish student.185 It also led to the development of some parallel
institutions, officially in order to protect the cultural rights of each group. The Israeli educational system
was and continues to be divided into distinct segments: state-secular schools, state-religious schools,
independent religious schools, Arab schools, and private schools, with the majority of Israeli children
participating in state-run schools rather than private ones.186 However, the emergence of greater legal
equality between Arabs and non-Arabs within Israel led to some institutional shifts and the emergence of
new incentives for Israeli leaders.
The 1967 War, which occurred only a few months after the termination of military rule over
Israeli Arabs, caused another restructuring of the institutional structures of Israel and the West Bank. The
war ended with an uncontested Israeli military victory, resulting in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank
along with Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. This brought Israeli and West Bank institutions into contact
again for the first time since the end of the 1948 War. By December of 1967, the Israeli government
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began referring to the West Bank as “Judea and Samaria” as part of a process of legitimizing Israel’s
claim to the territory due to the connection to the ancient kingdom of Israel.187 The Knesset also passed a
law allowing for the extension of "the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel to any
area of Eretz Israel designated by the Government by order”188 and the Ministry of the Interior of Israel
issued a new regulation through which the West Bank and Gaza would no longer be considered enemy
territories.189
These new pieces of legislation represented a process through which Israel attempted to exert a
legitimate political claim to exercise sovereignty over the newly occupied areas. Existing international
law during this period codified the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”190 This meant
that rather than being able to simply rely on obtaining legitimacy through military victory to administer
the territory, the Israeli government was incentivized to legitimize its control over the West Bank through
other means that would be seen as more valid in the post-World War II era, such as historical connections
and the Jewish ethnic and religious connection to the region. The fact that the Jordanian annexation of the
West Bank was solely recognized by the United Kingdom and Pakistan further complicated matters as it
meant that Jordan could not be considered the true sovereign power of the West Bank should the Israeli
occupation be seen as illegitimate.191 Thus, the murky legal status of the West Bank along with the
ideological incentive of occupation of the West Bank in order to allow for the annexation of East
Jerusalem and the potential future incorporation of portions of the historical Israeli state into the modern
one, incentivized policies from the Israeli government that paved the way for either continued occupation
of the territory or eventual annexation.
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank led to a termination of a majority of the Jordanian
institutions operating in the territory. Proclamation No. 2, or the Proclamation Regarding Regulation of
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Administration and Law, which was authored by the Israel Defense Forces replaced Jordanian institutions
with institutions governed by the IDF.192 Proclamation No. 2 set the basis for the new institutional
structures of the West Bank. Under the proclamation, all property under the control of the Jordanian
government in the West Bank at the time of the issuance of the proclamation would be transferred to the
control of the IDF. Furthermore, all “authority of government, legislation, appointment and
administration pertaining to the region or its residents”193 would also fall under the control of the IDF.
These institutional changes represented a transition from Jordanian ethnonational institutions to
an institutional structure not designed to truly promote any identity but rather solely to ensure the IDF had
the capacity to administer the West Bank, placing it in a position of limbo where sovereignty was in the
hands of the Israeli state, but citizens of the West Bank were ineligible for Israeli citizenship. In the
broader context of the Israeli state as a whole, the occupation of the West Bank without the provision of
equal citizenship or rights for its residents once again created a system of systemic and explicit
discrimination that furthered the ethnonational character of Israeli institutions. The new indicator scores
coded for 1993 (after the consolidation of IDF rule over the West Bank but before the signing of the Oslo
Accords, representing the 1967-1993 period) are shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Institutional Identity Type Scores for Israel and the West Bank in 1993

In 1993, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization signed the Oslo
Accords designed to facilitate a settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through direct negotiations
between the two parties rather than intermediaries such as Egypt or Jordan.194 The agreement established
the Palestinian Authority and a new framework for governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A number
of factors incentivized the shift in institutional structures as a result of the Oslo Accords. The first was the
fact that in 1988, the Jordanian government withdrew all of its claims to the West Bank, removing the
chance of a repeat of the land for peace deal achieved with Egypt in which Jordan would theoretically
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regain sovereignty of the West Bank in exchange for peace with Israel.195 As part of its abdication of
claims, the Jordanian government also recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the “sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”196 The Jordanian government also dissolved the lower
house of its parliament as, at the time, half of its seats were reserved to represent constituencies of the
West Bank, further severing West Bank ties with Jordanian institutions.197 The recognition and related
actions increased the legitimacy of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people while
furthering the disconnect between West Bank and Jordanian institutions. Furthermore, the preceding
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty along with Israel’s new negotiations with Jordan over a peace agreement
represented a shift in perceived Israeli-Arab dynamics in which Arab states no longer needed to be
viewed as solely hostile actors in the minds of Israelis, thus creating a new potential for the acceptability
of a Palestinian state or another form of Palestinian Arab autonomy. Thus, changing international
dynamics assisted in shifting the incentives of Israeli leaders towards being more in favor of the potential
for Palestinian Arab autonomy or independence.
The so-called “constructive ambiguity”198 of the Oslo Accords meant that the resulting
institutional structures were both separate from and intertwined with Israeli structures. The 1995 Oslo II
Accords divided the West Bank into three areas. Area A, which has no territorial continuity, was placed
under full control of the Palestinian Authority.199 Entry into this area was forbidden for Israeli citizens,
but as of 2002, the IDF abolished regulations prohibiting it from entering Area A and now does so to
conduct raids often with the assistance of the Palestinian security forces.200 Area B was placed under
Palestinian civil control and joint Palestinian-Israeli security control.201 Area C was placed under full
Israeli civil and security control and contains Israeli settlements and outposts. While the transfer of
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control of Area C to the Palestinians was set to begin by the end of 1999, this failed to occur and the
Israeli government continues to have full control of the area, which represents 63% of the West Bank and
much of its natural resources.202 While the establishment of the Palestinian Authority allowed for greater
Palestinian control over areas relating to civil concerns such as education and related policies as well as
for the election of representatives and a separate institutional structure, the continued presence of Israeli
military forces and Israeli civil control over much of the territory resulted in the situation that persists
today. This situation makes it so that while separate structures for Israel and the Palestinian Authority
exist, both promoting their own respective ethnonational identities, the institutional regimes remain
interconnected and the West Bank institutions remain heavily dependent on the Israeli ones. This has
resulted in the indicator scores displayed in Figure 12, which are current as of 2018.
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Figure 12: Institutional Identity Type Scores for Israel and the West Bank in 2018

While there have been shifts in the institutional regimes of both Israel and the West Bank, there
have been no shifts in the types of identities promoted by their institutional structures. Unlike in the
situation with Kosovo, international responses to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have focused on the twostate solution as the proper way of resolving the conflict. Under this solution, rather than forming a
common unifying identity, there would be a functionally ethnic-based partition between what would
become Israel and Palestine. This solution assumes that ethnic partition would be the best solution to the
conflict. It also ignores existing diversity within Israel, where not only is approximately a quarter of the
state Arab, but a notable portion of the state is neither Arab nor Jewish, and the existing diversity within
the West Bank. In terms of domestic incentives, the growing Israeli Arab population has provoked
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backlash from parts of the Jewish majority, resulting in legislative actions such as the 2018 Israeli Nation
State Law designed to ensure the Jewish ethnonational character of the state.203 Israel’s position as a
technologically advanced state has also offered it other avenues to resist demographic incentives to
promote a civic-national identity.
The Israeli government provides women under 45 with unlimited funds necessary to undergo IVF
treatment to have up to two children.204 This policy includes funding a type of IVF treatment that has
gained limited acceptance in other states, namely IVF using genetic material from a deceased donor. In
order to be eligible, the donor must have either specified their interest in having their material preserved
and used later, potentially by a stranger, in a biological will or whose legal representatives make a
convincing case that the deceased wanted biological children.205 The flexibility given in order to allow for
greater use of deceased donor material is due in part to the past traumas making up part of the core of the
Jewish Israeli identity.206 Past mass killings and genocides along with existing mandatory conscription
have led to the Israeli government choosing to “err on the side of life”207 in reproductive-related decisionmaking. While these experiences are central to the Jewish Israeli national consciousness, the demographic
challenge posed by Arab birth rates has also induced the Israeli government to take actions beyond
promoting Jewish immigration in order to preserve their demographic majority.208 These actions have
included ones such as the promotion of procedures that would allow for the birth of a greater number of
Jewish Israeli children and making decisions such as assuming that deceased Jewish Israelis would want
biological children even if they left no written record to that end.209 Thus, the lack of international
pressure along with the capacity for domestic political elites to both find ways to resist pressures such as
those coming from impending demographic decline and to manipulate Jewish ethnonational sentiment for
their own political gain has led to the continuation of the ethnonational character of Israeli institutions.
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From the Palestinian side, reliance on aid and diplomatic assistance from states with similar Arab
ethnonational identities, such as the rich Gulf States and Jordan, has incentivized the continuation of
institutions promoting an Arab ethnonational identity.210 An emphasis on the failure to provide
Palestinians with institutions allowing them to exercise their right to self-determination has also proved
diplomatically productive for Palestinian political elites.211 As this argument relies heavily on
assumptions regarding the idea that ethnic and national groups are inherently deserving of selfdetermination rights, the continuation of institutions promoting an ethnonational identity serves to ensure
the legitimacy of this appeal. Thus, Palestinian political elites continue to be similarly incentivized to
shape institutions that promote an ethnonational identity.
The 2003 Palestinian Basic Law, along with the 2005 amendments, is the most recent legal
documents functioning as a semi-constitution for areas under the Palestinian Authority. Taken together,
the Basic Law and its amendments demonstrate much of the legislative components underlying the type
of identity promoted for Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank. One of the first elements made clear
in the Palestinian Basic Law is an appeal to pan-Arab nationalism as it states that “Palestine is part of the
larger Arab world, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation. Arab unity is an objective that
the Palestinian people shall work to achieve.”212 This represents an appeal to a type of Qawmi
nationalism, which in the Arab context refers to a hybridization of nation-statist nationalism,
demonstrated through the reference to Palestine as a specific entity worthy of allegiance, and pan-Arab
nationalism, demonstrated through the reference to the broader notion of Arab unity.213 It also emphasizes
the Arab identity of the Palestinian state, which is reinforced by the chosen state symbols. The chosen
Palestinian flag is modeled after that of the flag of the Arab Revolt and closely resembles the flags of
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nearby Arab states, especially the Jordanian flag.214 Thus, the ethnic aspect of Palestinian identity is one
emphasized in the chosen state symbols of the Palestinian Authority, its Basic Laws, and other aspects of
its institutional structure, such as its educational system.
The 2003 Basic Law goes on to state that Islam is to be the state religion of Palestine and that
“the principles of Islamic Shari’a shall be a principal source of legislation”215 and that other “divine
religions” should be respected as well. The religious aspect of the Palestinian Basic Law along with the
religious elements of the Israeli government, particularly the power of Haredi parties in more recent
years, points to a common area where the establishment of a non-ethnic and non-religious identity has
been difficult in both Israel in the West Bank. Appeals to religion in both cases decrease the capacity for
compromise and when viewpoints are legitimized via religious means, such as with the Haredi promotion
of Israeli irredentism or Hamas’ appeals to Islamic fundamentalism, it more easily leads to institutional
structures that demonize out-groups because of their failure to adhere to the correct religious doctrine.216
Also similarly to the divisions within Israeli society, conflicts between Palestinian groups on the
importance of religion to the Palestinian national and ethnic identity contribute to difficulty not only in
forming a non-ethnic based identity but also forming an ethnic-based identity that remains salient to all its
members.217 The memorialization of individuals who were killed committing acts of terrorism against
Israelis in areas of the West Bank as martyrs alongside those harmed by IDF forces while not committing
acts of terrorism also both introduce a religious aspect into Palestinian national commemoration and
group together all aspects of “resistance”, both violent and nonviolent and against civilians and against
security forces.218
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While the current incentives promote the continuation of ethnonational institutional structures,
these incentives may shift in the future. The next section will discuss the possible shifts in incentives that
could lead to the formation of institutions promoting a civic-national identity as well as how these
institutions may be structured.

The Construction of a Common Identity
Unlike in the situation of south Kosovo and north Kosovo, neither Israel nor the West Bank has
any indicator scores relating to their legal, implementation, or total averages that are above zero. This is in
part due to differences in the natures of the two regions. In the case of Kosovo, there are no major actors
or proposals that would separate north Kosovo and make it its own independent state. Because of this, the
government in Pristina has made efforts to allow for the inclusion of north Kosovo into the central
identity of the state, which then also reinforces the need for a non-ethnic central identity supported by
Kosovo’s legal regime. The continued focus on the two-state solution as a means of resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, however, means that the West Bank and Israel do not build institutions with the other
in mind. Furthermore, the idea of a solution based around ethnic partition, or “two states for two peoples,”
legitimizes ethnic-based identities for both the West Bank and for Israel. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian
leaders are currently seeking to shape an identity or create institutions inclusive of all individuals living in
both Israel and the West Bank, or of all individuals living within their respective areas. This is shown
clearly in Figure 12, which depicts the scores for Israel and the West Bank.
This section discusses the ways institutional structures might shift as a result of changed
incentives due to the implementation of legislation imposing a one-state solution rather than the more
standard two-state solution. It does so by first examining how what the changed incentives would be and
how they might change institutions should a one-state solution be implemented that would grant equal
citizenship to Israelis and Palestinians. While not discussed internationally, this solution has been met
with serious consideration by some Israelis. Among all Israelis, 28% oppose annexation. 11% would
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support full annexation with political rights for Palestinians.219 16% support full annexation with no
political rights for Palestinians.220 15% support annexation of Area C.221 Among non-Jews, 35% oppose
annexation, 20% support full annexation with political rights for Palestinians, 7% support full annexation
without political rights for Palestinians, and 4% support annexing Area C.222 The remainder are
undecided. The results of this poll demonstrate that support for the two-state solution is shrinking among
both Jews and non-Jews within Israel; however, there is also no consensus on the form a one-state
solution would take. This section then examines the implications of a one-state solution that annexes most
or all of the West Bank but does not grant citizenship to Palestinians. It concludes by analyzing how the
nature of the policy of annexation would impact shifts in incentives, especially electoral incentives, and
thus shifts in institutional structures.
The maps depicted in Figures 13 and 14 further demonstrate that with regard to the combined
averages for both the West Bank and Israel, there are no general categories where either obtain a positive
score.223 Figures 13 and 14 also show that when the general averages are compared against each other,
Israel scores higher than the West Bank. This is due to the changes made in Israel after Israeli Arabs were
no longer under military rule within the 1967 borders, which then led to institutional changes and better
protection for linguistic, religious, and other rights of minorities within Israel that could theoretically be
applied to those within the West Bank as well. Thus, some actions that have been taken by the Israeli
government to justify expansion or annexation also prove helpful in creating structures needed for a nonethnic identity, or at least the greater acceptance of one.
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Figure 13: Combined Average for Israel and the West Bank (1948)224

Figure 14: Combined Average for Israel and the West Bank (2018)225
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Specifically, with regard to non-ethnic identity formation incorporating both Israel and the West
Bank, some proposals have been set forth that would allow this to be considered more seriously. Israeli
President Reuven Rivlin stated in 2017 that should Israel annex the West Bank, an idea that has been
gaining increased traction, Palestinians should be granted full Israeli citizenship.226 This aligns well with
the ideas of preceding Israeli leaders, such as Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who once proposed in a
draft of his autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza that Palestinians should be allowed to choose
between Israeli and Jordanian citizenship and, if they chose Israeli citizenship, be given full and equal
rights as other Israelis.227 This new form of a more inclusive Israeli identity would align well with the idea
underpinning the “I am an Israeli” movement founded by Uzzi Ornan, which seeks reorient the identity of
the state towards an “Israeli” nationality rather than a state made up of many nations.228 This would
contradict a ruling from the Israeli Supreme Court stating that no “Israeli” nation exists as that could
threaten the Jewish nature of the state.229 The growth of movements such as the “I am an Israeli”
movement, combined with the growing acceptability of suggestions such as granting full citizenship to
Palestinians, as evidenced by the Israeli president being able to voice such an opinion, demonstrates that
there may be an opportunity for the establishment of a civic-national Israeli identity should the incentives
and legislation align correctly.
Shifts in the U.S. government have also opened the door for a one-state solution. The Trump
administration stated that support would be given to any solution, one-state or two-state, that could be
agreed upon by both parties.230 New Democratic member of the House of Representatives, PalestinianAmerican Rashida Tlaib, also indicated her support for the one-state solution, stating that “separate but

226

Naomi Zevelof, "Israel's President Backs One-State Solution — With Equal Rights for Palestinians Read more:
https://forward.com/fast-forward/362943/israels-president-backs-one-state-solution-with-equal-rights-for-palestinia/," Forward,
last modified March 17, 2017, https://forward.com/fast-forward/362943/israels-president-backs-one-state-solution-with-equalrights-for-palestinia/.
227
William Claiborne, "Begin Presents Palestinian Autonomy Plan to Cabinet Group," Washington Post (Washington, DC), May
4, 1979, , https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/05/04/begin-presents-palestinian-autonomy-plan-to-cabinetgroup/57bd15c6-07f2-4035-aee7-762706b2d09b/?utm_term=.352baa17c96c.
228
Aviram Zino, "No 'Israelis' in Israel?," Yet, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3466379,00.html.
229
Ofer Neiman, trans., "Israeli Supreme Court Rejects Israeli Nationality Status: Excerpts from Ruling," Middle East Monitor,
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/ornan_v_state_of_israel_summary.pdf.
230
Ian Lustick, "Could Trump's Radical Approach Bring Peace to Israel and Palestine?," The Guardian, ,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/22/trump-peace-israel-palestine-two-state-solution.

76
equal does not work.”231 The growing acceptability of a one-state solution from the perspective of the US
government, along with voiced opinions against a two-state or one-state solution with parallel systems
and different levels of citizenship could give new incentives for Israeli politicians to move towards a
civic-national identity. These incentives could either be a desire for American approval for a one-state
solution or a need to maintain American aid funding should the sentiments of individuals such as
Representative Tlaib gain broader acceptance. From the Palestinian side, concerns regarding the one-state
solution stem largely from concerns that a one-state solution would still contain two separate and
inherently unequal systems.232 The concerns stemming from Palestinian negotiators, the Israeli president,
and outside but invested parties thus point to the central need to find a way to ensure equality in any
system that would emerge after a final peace agreement.
The proposal that any solution leading to one state would require equal citizenship for all
members would cause a major shift in many aspects of the scores given to Israel and the West Bank. One
major reason for the low scores in the area of voting rights, for example, is the fact that Palestinians and
Israelis do not have any common representation, a fact that would be changed should they all have the
same citizenship, assuming that the solution followed the solution proposed by President Rivlin and
provided fully equal citizenship for all residents. This would also be true for areas such as military
involvement, where a common citizenship would also allow for broader military participation instead of
the situation as it is now, where Palestinians cannot join the Israeli military and have no military of their
own. The integration of Palestinians into a common welfare system with Israelis would be facilitated by
this as well, even if it would not fully remedy existing inequalities between Jews and Arabs within Israeli
institutions.
Some models have been put into place regarding educational systems that would allow for nonethnic based and co-existence focused education. Two bilingual schools established in Israel have
attempted to create curricula that both promote bilingual education and the formation of non-ethnic
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identities. This is through both a bilingual and civic-focused curriculum as well as through the
establishment of new commemorative ceremonies that include aspects of the various cultures of the
students of the school.233 One of these is the “Hanukkah-Idel Fiter-Christmas” ceremony, which
incorporates aspects from the various holidays into a type of communal celebration that includes the
identities of the various students but also allowed the distinct portions to be shown.234
The second type of ceremonies the school marks is that of national ceremonies. The bilingual
schools mark both Palestinian and Israeli national holidays instead of attempting to ignore these aspects
of the national identities of their students. In allowing students to observe and participate in a variety of
national ceremonies, the schools delink these ceremonies from their ethnic affiliation and encourage
students to discuss what these events mean in their own personal context.235 While both ceremonies were
generally accepted by students, teachers, and parents, the first ceremony allowed for the creation of a
greater degree of cohesion between students as it allowed for them to participate in one ceremony
together (rather than a number of separate ones) while preserving aspects of their cultural identities,
which made the giving up of other aspects (such as the more nationalist-oriented aspects of the holiday
celebrations) more palatable.236 These traditions, combined with aspects of civic education and a
commitment to bilingualism at the school, show how integrated education can encourage, even though it
would not mandate, the formation of non-ethnic ties and promotion of inter-ethnic reconciliation. These
holidays also demonstrate the importance of performative aspects of citizenship and participation in
common events in forming non-ethnic ties, something that would also help facilitate the creation of a
broader non-ethnic identity.
A one-state solution along the lines of equal citizenship would also alter the legal and institutional
regimes present in the West Bank. Instead of it being separated into the areas outlined as per the Oslo
Accords, it would most likely be incorporated into Israel as one area, or multiple districts, under Israeli
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civil governance. This would then lead to the possibility of a more fully integrated school system, or at
minimum, one where integration could be possible. The influx of new citizens with the capacity to vote
would also lead to the establishment of new potential voter bases for political parties and would also
incentivize increased bilingual education and material. As seen with the Kosovo model, the granting of
undifferentiated citizenship across ethnic lines assists in the formation of salient non-ethnic identities by
bringing individuals together into a common system they can all become equally invested in. As seen
with the distinction between north and south Kosovo, group-differentiated policies that lessen one group’s
investment, such as the fact that individuals living in north Kosovo do not pay taxes to the central
government, increase the salience of separate regional or ethnic identities and reduce the salience of the
central group one. Thus, the creation of a common citizenship, or the incorporation of Palestinians into
the existing Israeli citizenship, would both create incentives for all citizens to become invested in the
institutions they stand to be affected by but now have the capacity to affect in return.
The idea of annexing the West Bank and providing equal citizenship to Palestinians is not,
however, the only annexation proposal in existence. More ethnonationalist proposals also exist, which
would create different incentives for the Israeli government and would impose a different type of
institutional structure as compared to those under the civic-national model. Other calls for the annexation
of the West Bank do so by calling it the “Zionism of the 21st century,”237 indicating that any annexation
would mean the continuation of the present institutional structure, necessitating either explicitly unequal
citizenship or the continuation of policies where groups exist on a hierarchy despite nominally equal
citizenship. One evidence of such a move is the opening of a new road northeast of Jerusalem between
Hizma and Zayem, which would feature completely separate lanes for Israelis and Palestinians.238 The
opening of this road is evidence of a different type of annexation, which would create one state but
impose parallel and unequal systems for Israelis and Palestinians. Another potential form annexation
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might take would be through the annexation of Area C to Israel.239 This proposal would leave the majority
of Palestinians outside of the Israeli state but without the capacity to form their own state because of the
patchy and non-contiguous nature of Area A and Area B.240 These areas would then be provided
autonomy but not citizenship, leading to a continuation of the current situation but without the presence of
the potential Palestinian state.
Thus, two divergent options exist for the increasingly likely scenario of Israel annexing the West
Bank. One would be that proposed by President Rivlin, drawing on ideas promoted by the “I am an
Israeli” movement and existing proponents of coexistence and a multiethnic Israel, the other supported by
members of the current governing coalition and supporting annexation of the West Bank with a
continuation of the ethnic-based characteristics of the Israeli state. The first option would incentivize a
more civic-national identity due to the expanded voter base, which would then be much more multiethnic
and with a higher proportion of Arabs, while the second would incentivize the continuation of the existing
ethnonational identity.

Conclusion
The separate systems in Israel and the West Bank have already strongly institutionalized ethnicbased identities through symbols, language policies, educational curricula, and other factors. The
increasing diversity within both regions as well as the impact of the West Bank settlements and a lack of
true investment in the two-state solution on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, however, mean that the
chances of a one-state solution purposefully or by default is increasing in likelihood. Thus, policies that
would be put into place to ensure such a solution could be implemented successfully are worth
examining. One clear one that could serve to create a salient non-ethnic identity that would tie all groups
within the region together, not simply Jews and Arabs, would be the proposal to grant undifferentiated
citizenship to all individuals living within the region after the annexation of the West Bank. This
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expanded citizenship, combined with policies that would promote civic engagement and coexistence,
along with policies such as those implemented in Kosovo regarding bilingualism, civic education, and
protection for cultural identities within the umbrella non-ethnic national identity, could prove successful.
Furthermore, these solutions would be applicable to Israel separate from the West Bank or the West Bank
separate from Israel should the two-state solution end up being implemented after all. The continued
growth of movement across borders, the yet-unresolved issue of Palestinian refugees, and the growing
ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity of both Israel and the West Bank means that even should an
ethnic-based partition take place, it would not create the homogenous societies needed to survive and
thrive without some non-ethnic unifying factor.
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Conclusion
Discussion
Ethnicity remains an important and politically relevant identity across regions and states. The
continued relevance of ethnic identity has combined with the heterogeneity of most states, increasing
global migration, and impending challenges due to future resource scarcity and climate-change related
effects, coupled with the history of political violence along ethnic lines, and the continued primacy of
ethnic identity as a form of political affiliation to create a situation where ethnic-based violence has
become increasingly likely. The increased likelihood of conflict also leads to the question of if civicnational identities can only be institutionalized and promoted in wealthy, stable democracies or if these
identities can be established and promoted within states emerging from ethnic-based violence or other
forms of sectarian strife. The importance of incentive shifts in switching the identities promoted by state
institutions helps to examine some of these questions and provides insight into the importance of
institutions in shaping the politically relevant identities within states.
A combination of examining the evolution of the identities promoted by state institutions and the
politically salient identities of a state gives credence to models focusing on the impact of institutional
construction as it relates to identity construction and ethnic conflict. Furthermore, dividing the
institutional scores from the implementation scores demonstrates that adding in the implementation aspect
can give a more accurate picture of the identity being promoted by a state as compared to when the
explicit institutional construction is examined alone. This allows for situations where ethnic divisions are
created either purposefully but non-explicitly or accidentally but still actively to be observed rather than
overlooked. As seen through both the cases of Kosovo and Israel, institutions can lack explicit ethnic
barriers but still functionally implement them, and inefficient implementation of institutional regimes can
also an idea to be promoted unintentionally. Thus, while models examining the impact of institutional
structure on the salient identities present within a state can provide useful contributions, the impact of
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non-explicit ethnic barriers and implementation differences should be considered when building models
or generally examining institutional identity promotion.
The case of Kosovo demonstrates that the ability to develop a civic-national identity is not
dependent on a state’s wealth, size, or relative power. Furthermore, Kosovo’s status as a state with a very
recent history of ethnic cleansing and position in a region with a history of ethnic conflict and highly
salient ethnic identities demonstrates that civic-national identities are not restricted to states without a
history of ethnic violence but, rather can be implemented and developed within states recently emerging
from situations of ethnic violence. The Kosovo case also demonstrates the different roles ethnic kin states
can play in influencing the salient political identities within a state. In the context of north Kosovo, Serbia
played a key role in preventing the ethnic Serb community from integrating into the rest of the state to the
point where north Kosovo’s autonomy became institutionalized within the Brussels Agreement. In the
case of south Kosovo, however, Albania has not attempted to encourage a “Greater Albania” movement
or otherwise annex Kosovo or other Albanian-majority areas, instead encouraging ties between Albanian
communities within different states through mutual membership in organizations such as NATO, as
exemplified through their support for Macedonia’s ascension process. Thus, the Kosovo case draws
importance to the roles of the incentives faced by neighboring and kin states and how those can help or
hinder the formation of civic-national identities.
One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from the case of Kosovo is that turnover in
political elites is not necessary to ensure the development of a civic-national identity. Some elites from
the pre-2008 period remain politically powerful but have moderated their positions in light of new
objectives, moving from an Albanian-nationalist identity to a Kosovar one even to the point of supporting
removing the Albanian flag from major sites and replacing it with the Kosovar one. This means that given
the correct incentives and processes, a mass turnover of elites and bureaucrats—an action that could lead
to state instability and resentment—may not be necessary to build a salient civic-national identity. The
relatively peaceful movement from UNMIK to Kosovo’s independence, despite major powers opposing
Kosovar independence, further demonstrates that the necessary institutional shifts can take place without
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mass reorganization or bureaucratic turnover, but other cases also demonstrate that reorganization and
elite turnover do not prevent the formation of a civic-national identity.
The case of Israel and the West Bank provides valuable insights as well. First, the impact of civil
society organizations in enabling the removal of the military government over Israeli Arabs and later
constructing schools promoting civic-national identities and peaceful coexistence shows the ability of
civil society to reshape the salient identities within states. It also shows that, especially within
democracies, that citizens can play a strong role in reshaping the incentives of political elites in terms of
what identities they institutionalize. In the case of the removal of the military government, for example,
civil society mobilization made the continuation of the policy politically harmful, thus leading to its
removal. This means that while democracy can increase the ethnic nature of some institutions by
incentivizing elites to make ethnic appeals to win votes and by increasing competition over resources
should the demographic make-up of the government affect public goods provisioning to different areas, it
can also incentivize the formation of civic-national identities through electoral pressures. This case also
demonstrates that the formation of a civic-national identity is not simply a result of economic
development and material gains as Israel is an OECD member and considered a wealthy state. It also
demonstrates that wealthy states have options not available to poorer states to promote an ethnic state
identity and maintain it even in the face of demographic challenges.
Israel’s movement towards annexing the West Bank also shows how different policy structures
can reshape incentives without international or foreign involvement. The structure of the annexation
itself, be it an irredentist annexation without equal citizenship for Palestinians or a Rivlin-style annexation
that provides full and equal citizenship, would provide political elites with distinct electoral incentives,
thus leading to different institutional changes.

Potential Extensions
The implications coming from the cases of Kosovo, Israel, and the West Bank on the impact of
the construction of civic-national identities have meaning on cases outside of the ones discussed
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throughout this thesis. The degree to which incentives change based on alterations to the geopolitical
situation surrounding a state, domestic political incentives related to growing heterogeneity of
populations, and impending resource scarcity have implications for many states, especially those currently
embroiled in conflict or in a tenuous peace. The cases of Rojava, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the
relationship between the Republic of Korea and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea demonstrate
other applications of the implications from these cases.
Other cases demonstrate that incentives can switch towards a civic-national identity and away
from an ethnic one even without the influence of external actors. The case of Rojava, or Kurdish-majority
northern Syria, is one of these cases. The cases of Rojava and Kosovo demonstrate that assumptions
stating that peace in ethnic conflict can only come via power-sharing methods or otherwise legitimizing
the role of ethnicity within political society are not always correct. These cases also demonstrate that
institutions promoting a civic-national identity can be constructed successfully even in situations where
violence or a recent history of violence increases the salience of ethnic identity.
Rojava, formally known as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria or the Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria, was established on March 17th, 2016.241 It emerged after the
withdrawal of Syrian government forces from Kurdish-majority northeastern Syria and the formation of
the Syrian Democratic Council, which is composed of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians.242 In the
case of Rojava, the ideology of the dominant political group combined with incentives coming from a
need to maintain stability in the face of the Syrian Civil War as well as the opportunity given to reshape
institutions due to the inability of the central government to oppose changes to the institutional structure
of the region. This led to the establishment of the Rojava Cantons which, according to its social contract,
enshrines environmental sustainability, democratic participation, and peaceful coexistence as its central
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principles.243 Rojava’s social contract also implements an institutional structure that both protects the
cultural and linguistic expression of minority groups while ensuring the institutions themselves promote a
common identity rather than the identities of the individual ethnic groups located within Rojava.244 The
case of Rojava thus demonstrates that not only can incentives reshape the identities promoted by
institutions, but also that these shifts can occur within the midst of a civil war partially along ethnic and
religious lines.
In contrast to Kosovo’s attempts to form a unified identity as the basis for their post-conflict
society, Bosnia and Herzegovina took a starkly different approach through institutionalized ethnic
consociationalism. Bosnia’s institutional structure has led to continued inter-ethnic distrust and highly
salient ethnic identities, demonstrating how different institutional approaches to post-conflict state and
nation-building result in distinct outcomes for states within the same region and a similar history of
conflict. Bosnia’s focus on protections for individual groups rather than forming a unified identity further
demonstrates the risk cases like Rojava face when post-conflict, they need to remain unified without the
impetus to do so stemming from the presence of external threats.
While the Dayton Agreement was designed to ensure Bosnia’s multiethnic identity is protected,
its state structures institutionalized ethnic partition at all levels of government, leading to residual ethnic
tension that often threatens to ruin the post-war tenuous peace.245 Some existing proposals to fully
incorporate the Serb Republic of Bosnia into the broader state and transition away from a structure
legitimized through ethnic representation would also reshape incentives faced by leaders to alter
institutions.246 Similarly to the case of Israel and the West Bank, this could either be done in a way that
would solely increase the ethnic identification of citizens and breed resentment towards the national
identity, or could be done a way that would promote equal citizenship. In the case of Bosnia, this could
243

The Constitution of the Rojava Cantons," YPG International, https://ypginternational.blackblogs.org/2016/07/01/charter-ofthe-social-contract-in-rojava/.
244
Ibid.
245
Patrice McMahon and Jon Western, "The Death of Dayton," Foreign Affairs 88 (2009): 73,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/fora88&id=841&men_tab=srchresults.
246
Jasmina Kuzmanovic, Andrea Dudik, and Rodney Jefferson, "The Balkans Are Coming Apart at the Seams Again,"
Bloomberg, last modified October 19, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-19/the-balkans-are-comingapart-at-the-seams-again.

86
mean a situation where citizens not members of the three constituent ethnic groups could run for statelevel elected office and institutional barriers preventing voting across ethnic lines could be removed.
Thus, these two cases demonstrate how not only the overall nature of institutional or policy changes
matter but how the implementation of these changes can often be a defining factor in what identities are
promoted and how successful that promotion is.
The question of Korean unification is another area where the development of distinct institutions
relating to identity hinder the resolution of conflicts, even those stemming from non-ethnic sources. The
continued inter-Korean conflict stems from Cold War disputes between communist and capitalist states,
but reunification is hampered now not by divergent political and economic systems but also divergent
identities. The regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is legitimized through
ethnonationalist appeals to the purity of the Korean people.247 According to North Korean thought, this
purity comes with an inherent innocence that requires the protection of a strong leader.248 This
ethnonationalist identity has also governed North Korea’s actions in the inter-Korean peace process,
leading to the promotion of reunification based on and legitimized by the shared Korean ethnic identity.249
In contrast, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) remains only partially tied to an ethnonationalist
identity. The state’s increasingly heterogenous population due to the need for migrant labor and
intermarriage between Koreans and non-Koreans has led to a shift towards greater inclusion of minority
groups.250 Furthermore, linguistic divergences between North Koreans and South Koreans along with a
growing cultural divide and years of separation have led many young South Koreans to view North
Koreans as out-group members rather than members of a shared ethnic group.251
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Despite these changes in salient political identities for young South Koreans, both the North
Korean and South Korean governments continue to push for reunification because of this shared ethnic
identity that is not salient for young South Koreans, leading to a declining approval rating for unification
among members of this demographic.252 As the inter-Korean peace process has been premised on the
eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula, this trend risks upending the fundamental basis of the
process. These shifts then show another area in which the development of a civic-national identity may be
necessary for the implementation of a peace plan not due to a history of ethnic conflict but rather due to
divergences in the concept of what constitutes a member of the common in-group. Thus, while the Korean
Peninsula remains largely homogenous despite some demographic changes, alterations in perceptions of
who is a member of the in-group demonstrates how the need for a civic-national identity can arise.
Furthermore, the changes in South Korean perceptions of North Koreans demonstrate the instability of
ethnic-based rationale for agreements and institutional arrangements as perceptions of ethnic membership
are not stagnant and can thus shift over time.

Implications
The institutionalization of civic-national identities assists in reducing ethnic tensions for states
with a recent history of ethnic violence. The development of a civic-national identity also assists in
allowing survivors of ethnic conflict to come to terms with their trauma and rediscover their place within
the broader society. Healing for victims of ethnic violence and reconciliation between victims and
perpetrators is one of the most vital aspects of post-conflict institution building, both in order to ensure
state stability and to ensure the wellbeing of a state’s citizens. In Kosovo, wartime rape was one of the
main aspects of the campaign of ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians and the promoting of
Serbian ethnonationalism.253 President Atrifete Jahjaga, Kosovo’s first female president, has used
Kosovo’s new inclusive identity to also alter the response of Kosovar society towards survivors of sexual
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violence through using the shift in Kosovar culture to disconnect prejudices connected to Serbian and
Albanian ethnic identities from the new Kosovar identity.254 This has allowed for survivors of wartime
sexual assault to begin speaking out about their experiences. Traditional Albanian and Serbian cultural
mentalities formerly prohibited survivors from discussing their experiences due to fear of societal and
familial rejection. Using the space created by the new civic-national identity, which allows for survivors
to speak out without fear of harming the “honor” of their ethnic group, survivors have been able to find
their place within the state, contributing to the process of post-conflict healing.255 Opportunities given
through the formation of civic-national identities allowing for connections between ethnic groups also
allow for the acknowledgement of individual responsibility after ethnic conflict, thus avoiding the allure
of abdicating responsibility or indicting the entirety of any ethnic group. In the words of a Serb
acknowledging the need for a nonethnic identity in Kosovo and the broader Balkans, institutional changes
and the formation of civic-national identities allow societies to “bring back dignity both to the deceased
and to the living.”256
While an assumption relating to post-conflict state-building assumes a recent history of ethnic
violence increases the salience of ethnic identification, this does not preclude the formation of a civicnational identity. The Kosovo War is considered the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since the end of
World War Two.257 The war contained atrocities ranging from forced expulsions, desecration of religious
sites, the burning and looting of homes, schools, and healthcare facilities, sexual violence, and mass
executions, culminating in the attempted ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians.258 This conflict was not
an isolated incident, but rather the result of decades of oppression and inter-ethnic distrust and hatred
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between Albanians and Serbs, fueled by institutional promotions of ethnonational identities.259 Despite
this legacy of conflict and a peace of only twenty years, Kosovo has managed to institutionalize a salient
civic-national identity, allowing for a stable state and reconciliation between the ethnic groups within its
borders. While the continuation of an ethnonational identity in parts of north Kosovo have limited
Kosovo’s progress, the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence and new identity among minority groups in
south Kosovo and the movement towards not only tolerance but an emotional attachment to the Kosovar
identity demonstrate how even in regions with a recent history of violence can form salient civic-national
identities. Furthermore, the continued violence between Israelis and Palestinians demonstrate the danger
of the institutionalization of ethnonationalist identity, a danger that has no signs of receding in the near
future.
The development of a civic-national identity does not necessitate the elimination of ethnic
differences, the creation of homogenous states, or the suppression of minority cultural expression. While
impending shocks to modern societies seem poised to reignite conflicts between groups, the cases of
Kosovo, Rojava, Tanzania, and many others demonstrate that this conflict is not inevitable. Selfinterested elites, while prevalent, are also not completely prohibitive when it comes to constructing an
inclusive, stable, and salient national identity. Instead, a civic-national identity can develop through the
correct combination of incentives and institutional structures. Even in regions shattered by a recent
history of ethnic violence, willing actors can engineer fragmented societies into a sturdy cultural mosaic,
with each piece willingly melting with different and distinct elements to form a united story.
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Appendix I: Institutional Identity Type Score
The scores were developed according to the following indicators, with relevant separations into the
category of implementation and written legal standing:
Total: Refers to the average of the relevant variables.
1.49-2

Full civic national

0.5-1.49

Imperfect civic national

-0.5 - 0.49

Ambiguous identity

-1.5 - -0.49

Imperfect ethnonational

-2 - -1.49

Full ethnonational

School Curriculum: This variable refers to the degree that the educational system implements
curriculums and youth-focused programs that support the development of the central non-ethnic identity.
2

The public education system promotes a non-ethnic identity through the
curriculum and other means such as after-school programs promoting
bilingualism or cultural understanding.

1

The public education system promotes the central non-ethnic identity but
mainly or solely through the curriculum.

0

The public education does not promote the non-ethnic identity but remains
neutral between ethnic or cultural groupings.

-1

The curriculum is biased towards one ethnic or cultural group over others,
mainly by ignoring the histories of other ethnic groups. It does not advocate
for violence nor does it actively/directly reject the non-ethnic identity.

-2

The curriculum is biased towards one ethnic or cultural group over another. Its
content actively or subtly provokes violence against other groups and actively
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rejects key elements of the non-ethnic identity.

Language Rights: This variable refers to the degree to which institutions protect minority language
rights. It also refers to the degree to which all citizens are able to access government services in a
language they understand and the degree to which they promote bilingualism, multilingualism, or other
means through which linguistic cleavages can be reduced.
2

Institutions allow for the institutional protection of language rights and provide
accessible translation services. Knowledge of the main languages is promoted
for all citizens and especially government officials and cross-cultural language
programs are funded and promoted.

1

Institutions protect language rights and provide accessible translation services.
Bilingualism or multilingualism is promoted but not through government
programs or with sufficient funding.

0

There is institutional recognition of minority languages but difficulty in
obtaining accessible translation services. Multilingualism is not actively
promoted.

-1

There is no institutional recognition of minority languages and no promotion
of multilingualism. Translation services are not provided by the government
and may be difficult to obtain.

-2

There is no institutional recognition of minority languages and linguistic
assimilation is promoted and potentially forced.

Military Involvement: This variable refers to the degree to which varying cultural groups are allowed to
participate equally in the armed forces of the state. It also refers to the question of if military symbols are
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biased towards or against one group or another and, if mandatory service exists, if it is applied equally to
all groups.
2

The military is open to involvement across ethnic and cultural lines. There is
active recruitment of members of minority groups and all symbols are related
to the civic national identity and are ethnically neutral.

1

The military is open to involvement across ethnic and cultural lines with
limited recruitment of minority groups. All symbols are related to the civic
national identity and are ethnically neutral.

0

The military is open to involvement across ethnic lines. There is no
recruitment of minority groups and military symbols are neutral, if not actively
promoting the civic national identity.

-1

There are factors preventing recruitment across ethnic lines and military
symbols may be biased in favor of one group over another.

-2

There are active pressures, official or unofficial, preventing the involvement of
certain ethnic or cultural groups. The military symbols may be biased in favor
of one group over others.

Religious Rights: This variable refers to the question of if one religion is promoted by the government
over others, if freedom of religion is permitted and enforced, and if religious pluralism is promoted.
2

Religious freedom is institutionally protected. There is no state religion,
religious pluralism is promoted and coexistence programs are provided with
support. State symbols are religiously neutral.

1

Religious freedom is institutionally protected. There is no state religion and
religious pluralism is supported, if not actively promoted. State symbols are
religiously neutral.
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0

Religious freedom is official if not actively protected. There is no state
religion.

-1

Religious freedom may or may not be protected. There may be a state religion
and symbols may not be religiously neutral. There is no attempt to prevent the
practice of other religions.

-2

Religious freedom is not protected. There may be a state religion and state
symbols may not be religiously neutral. There are attempts to ban certain
religions.

Civic National Symbol Usage: This refers to the degree to which state symbols are non-ethnic and the
degree to which these symbols have widespread use, and if the general population feels an attachment to
them.
2

Civic national symbols are widespread and have popularity within the general
population. Ethnic-based symbols are not used by the government. The use of
these symbols is actively encouraged.

1

Civic national symbols are widespread and have some acceptance within the
general population. Ethnic-based symbols are not used by the government or
have limited use without discrimination against others.

0

Civic national symbols are generally used but potentially in conjunction with
ethnic-based symbols. There is limited support for them from the general
population.

-1

Civic national symbols are sometimes used and potentially not at all. There is a
bias towards ethnic-based symbols. The civic national symbols have limited
support if any.

-2

Civic national symbols are actively rejected in favor of ethnonationalist
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symbols.

Police Force: This refers to if all ethnic and cultural groups are permitted to join the police force, the
degree to which police officers are given cultural training if policing an area of a differing ethnicity, and
the ease through which citizens can communicate with the police and if they feel comfortable doing so.
2

All citizens are eligible to join the police force. There is active recruitment of
members of minority groups and cultural sensitivity training is provided.
Citizens are able to speak to officers in a language they can understand and
feel safe communicating with officers of a different ethnicity. Police violence
against minority groups is largely absent and punished when it occurs.

1

All citizens are eligible to join the police force. There is some degree of
sensitivity training. Citizens can usually speak to officers in a language they
understand and feel safe speaking with officers of a different ethnicity. Police
violence against minority groups is not widespread and is punished when it
occurs.

0

All citizens are eligible to join the police force. Citizens may have difficulty
communicating with police officers if they do not speak the majority language.
Police violence against minority groups is not widespread and is generally
punished.

-1

There are official or unofficial restrictions against some groups joining the
police force. The majority language is usually required to speak to police
officers. Police violence against minority groups may be present but is not
state-sanctioned.

-2

There are official or unofficial restrictions against some groups joining the
police force. The majority language is usually required to speak to police
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officers. There may be state-sanctioned police violence against minority
groups.

Voting Rights: This refers to if all citizens are permitted to vote and the degree to which voter
suppression is present and if there are protections against it.
2

All citizens are permitted to vote and do so without intimidation. There are
active protections against voter suppression.

1

All citizens are permitted to vote and do so without intimidation. There are
some measures in place to prevent voter suppression.

0

All citizens are permitted to vote but some intimidation may be present.

-1

There may be restrictions on voting biased against one ethnic group or another.
Voter intimidation may be present.

-2

There are active voting restrictions against certain groups or no elections at all.
Voter intimidation is widespread.

Ethnic Categories on Documents: This refers to the degree to which official documents, such as
national ID cards, birth certificates, citizenship papers, and other state-issued documents, make note in a
clear way of the bearer’s ethnic or national group.
2

Identification and documents make no reference to ethnic groupings, instead
only referring to individuals as citizens or otherwise residents of the state.

1

Identification and documents make no reference to ethnic groupings but make
no efforts to reinforce the non-ethnic identity of the state.

0

References to nationality or ethnicity are absent from documents.

-1

There is no explicit reference to ethnicity on documents, but there are clear
indicators that could allow individuals to assume the ethnic category of the
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bearer.
-2

Identification and documents make explicit reference to ethnicity.

Equal Provision of Public Goods: This refers to if all areas are given equal access to public goods such
as educational spending, road construction, and other attributes without consideration of the ethnic
makeup of the region. It also refers to if citizens participate in the same welfare system and are eligible to
receive the same benefits regardless of ethnic or cultural grouping.
2

All citizens participate in the same welfare system. There are measures to
ensure all groups benefit equally from public goods.

1

All citizens participate in the same welfare system. There are limited measures
to ensure all groups benefit equally from public goods.

0

All citizens participate in the same welfare system. There are no active
measures to ensure all groups benefit equally from public goods.

-1

Multiple parallel systems exist but provide for all citizens, the provision of
public goods is unequal across regions or varies based on the demographic
makeup of a region.

-2

Parallel systems exist or some ethnic or cultural groups are provided no
welfare benefits. Public good provision is unequal on clear ethnic grounds.

Existence of Coexistence Programs: This refers to if coexistence programs exist within the state and the
degree to which they are widespread and accepted.
2

State-funded and supported coexistence programs exist for all citizens.
Participation is actively promoted.

1

State-sponsored coexistence programs exist but have limited promotion.

0

Coexistence programs exist but with limited support from the state.
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-2

Coexistence programs are not widespread.

-2

Coexistence programs do not exist and there are barriers preventing their
institution.
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Appendix II: Institutional Identity Type Scores for Kosovo

District Name (2018)

North

South

Kosovo

Kosovo

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

1

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

2

Language Rights (Implementation)

-1

-1

2

2

-1

1

Military Involvement (Legal)

2

2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

0

1

Religious Rights (Legal)

2

2

-2

1

Integrated Police (Legal)

2

2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

1

1

-1

1

2

2

-2

2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Implementation)

2

2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Legal)

2

2

Existence of Coexistence Programs

0

2

Total

0.24

1.47

Legal Total

1.43

2.00

-0.29

0.86

Language Rights (Legal)
Military Involvement (Implementation)

Civic National Symbol Usage

Voting Rights (Implementation)
Voting Rights (Legal)
Equal Provision of Public Goods

Implementation Total
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Explanation for indicators (descriptions are only given for the implementation score when it differs
from the legal score):
School Curriculum (Legal):
North Kosovo
-2

Schools in north
Kosovo do not adhere
to the curriculum set
forth by the
government in Pristina
and instead promote a
curriculum designed by
the Serbian government
that includes nationalist
material and fails to
promote coexistence
programs.

South Kosovo
2

The curriculum created
by Kosovo’s central
government pays
special emphasis to the
issues of coexistence,
bilingualism, and
multiculturalism.

School Curriculum (Implementation):
North Kosovo
-2

South Kosovo
1

While the curriculum in
south Kosovo pays
strong attention to
issues of coexistence,
the implementation has
been lacking at times in
ensuring integration of
students.

Language Rights (Legal):
North Kosovo
2

Language rights for
minority groups are
ensured and translation
services are designed to
be accessible within
reason.

South Kosovo
2

Language rights for
minority groups are
ensured and translation
services are designed to
be accessible within
reason.

Language Rights (Implementation):
North Kosovo
-1

It is difficult to find
adequate translation
services and bilingual
education is rate.

South Kosovo
-1

Bilingual education is
growing but still
limited and translations
often have errors.
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Military Involvement (Legal):
North Kosovo
2

All ethnic and religious
groups are able to join
the Kosovar armed
forces equally.

South Kosovo
2

All ethnic and religious
groups are able to join
the Kosovar armed
forces equally.

Military Involvement (Implementation):
North Kosovo
-1

Strong pressure from
the Serbian government
makes it more difficult
for Kosovar Serbs from
the north to join the
Kosovar military
without facing
repercussions from
Belgrade.

South Kosovo
1

The government of
Kosovo is unable to
protect Kosovar Serbs
from the north from
threats that would
hinder them from
joining the Kosovar
armed forces, making
the integration of other
Serbs difficult as well.

Religious Rights (Legal):
North Kosovo
2

Freedom of religion is
protected by the
Kosovar constitution.

South Kosovo
2

Freedom of religion is
protected by the
Kosovar constitution.

Religious Rights (Implementation):
North Kosovo
0

The Serbian national
identity that is
prominent throughout
north Kosovo has deep
ties to Orthodox
Christianity, which
manifests at times by
using national symbols
tied to religious
imagery and
discrimination.

Civic National Symbol Usage:

South Kosovo
1

There are occasional
instances of
discrimination against
Orthodox Christians
due to the connections
between Orthodox
Christianity and the
Serbian national
identity.
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North Kosovo
-2

Ethnically neutral
symbols such as the
flag of Kosovo are
rejected in north
Kosovo in favor of
symbols linked to the
Serbian ethnic identity.

South Kosovo
1

Ethnically neutral
symbols are growing in
their popularity but
there are still
government-sanctioned
uses of ethnicallylinked symbols.

Voting Rights (Legal):
North Kosovo
2

All individuals are
eligible to vote for
representation in the
Kosovar parliament
equally.

South Kosovo
2

All individuals are
eligible to vote for
representation in the
Kosovar parliament
equally.
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Voting Rights (Implementation):
North Kosovo
-1

Ethnic-based violence
occurs around elections
and pressure from the
Serbian government not
to participate in
Kosovar institutions
diminishes voter
participation by Serbs
in north Kosovo.

South Kosovo
1

Voter turnout is at
times lower in minority
ethnic communities but
has been growing in
recent years.

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Legal):
North Kosovo
2

Documents make no
reference to ethnic
groupings and clearly
denote the citizen as a
Kosovar.

South Kosovo
2

Documents make no
reference to ethnic
groupings and clearly
denote the citizen as a
Kosovar.

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Implementation):
North Kosovo260
South Kosovo
2
2
Equal Provision of Public Goods :
North Kosovo
-2

Individuals in north
Kosovo do not pay
taxes to the central
Kosovar government
and do not participate
in the same welfare
systems. The influence
of the Serbian
government on north
Kosovo means
homogenous Serbs
areas are sometimes
given preferential
treatment for public
goods.

South Kosovo
2

Regardless of ethnic
group, all citizens of
south Kosovo
participate in the
Kosovar welfare
system and there are no
restrictions on ethnic
grounds on
participation. Public
goods are provided
without consideration
for ethnic group.

Coexistence Programs:
260

While this is not officially approved of by the institutional regime of north Kosovo, some members of the Serb community of
north Kosovo use Serbian passports rather than Kosovar ones.
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North Kosovo
0

Coexistence programs
are not supported by
institution in north
Kosovo but they do
exist and their presence
is growing.

South Kosovo
2

The government of
Kosovo, with assistance
from NGOs and other
governments, support
coexistence programs
financially and through
other means.
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Figure 15:Map depicting the combined average scores for north Kosovo and south Kosovo (1998)

Figure 16: Map depicting the combined average scores for north Kosovo and south Kosovo (2008)

Figure 17: Map depicting the combined average scores for north Kosovo and south Kosovo (2018)
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Figure 18:Map depicting the average implementation scores in south Kosovo and north Kosovo (1998)

Figure 19: Map depicting the average implementation scores in south Kosovo and north Kosovo (2008)

Figure 20: Map depicting the average implementation scores in south Kosovo and north Kosovo (2018)
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Figure 21: Map depicting the average legal scores in south Kosovo and north Kosovo (1998)

Figure 22:Map depicting the average legal scores in south Kosovo and north Kosovo (2008)

Figure 23: Map depicting the average legal scores in south Kosovo and north Kosovo (2018)
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District Name (2008)

North

South

Kosovo

Kosovo

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

0

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

0

Language Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

0

0

Military Involvement (Implementation)

-2

-2

Military Involvement (Legal)

-2

-2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

0

0

Religious Rights (Legal)

2

2

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Legal)

2

2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

1

1

Voting Rights (Implementation)

1

1

Voting Rights (Legal)

2

2

-2

2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Implementation)

2

2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Legal)

2

2

Existence of Coexistence Programs

0

0

-0.12

0.35

0.57

0.86

-0.29

0.00

Language Rights (Legal)

Civic National Symbol Usage

Equal Provision of Public Goods

Total
Legal Total
Implementation Total
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District (1998)

North

South

Kosovo

Kosovo

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

-2

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

-2

Language Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Language Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

Military Involvement (Implementation)

-2

-2

Military Involvement (Legal)

-2

-2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Religious Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

Civic National Symbol Usage

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Legal)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

Equal Provision of Public Goods

-2

-2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Implementation)

-2

-2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Legal)

-2

-2

Existence of Coexistence Programs

-2

-2

Total

-2

-2

Legal Total

-2

-2

Implementation Total

-2

-2
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Appendix III: Institutional Identity Type Scores for Israel and the West
Bank
District Name (2018)

Israel

West Bank

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

-2

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

-2

Language Rights (Implementation)

1

-2

Language Rights (Legal)

1

-1

Military Involvement (Implementation)

-1

-2

Military Involvement (Legal)

-1

-2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

-1

-2

Religious Rights (Legal)

-1

-2

Civic National Symbol Usage

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

-2

-2

2

2

Voting Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

0

0

-1

-1

1

1

-2

-2

Implementation Average

-1.14

-1.86

Legal Average

-0.29

-0.86

Combined Average

-0.82

-1.35

Integrated Police (Legal)

Existence of Coexistence Programs
Ethnic Categories on Documents (Implementation)
Ethnic Categories on Documents (Legal)
Equal Provision of Public Goods
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Explanation for indicators (descriptions are only given for the implementation score when it differs
from the legal score):
School Curriculum (Legal):
Israel
-2

261

Israeli schools are
divided into separate
tracks (state-secular,
state-religious,
independent religious,
and Arab and Druze
schools). Each school
has distinct curricula
and some fail to
educate students in key
unifying areas. 261
School textbooks often
use dehumanizing
depictions of Arabs,
especially in Haredi
schools.262

"Education: Primary," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Pina, Palestinian Education, 3.
263
Bar-Tal and Wexler, "Portrayal of the Other," 3.
262

West Bank
-2

Textbooks used in the
West Bank often
uncritically depict a
national narrative
describing the “other”
as an enemy in over
81% of textbooks.263
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School Curriculum (Implementation):

Israel
-2

West Bank
-2

Language Rights (Legal):

Israel
1

The Nation State Law
initially downgraded
Arabic, moving Israel’s
score down from a 2 to
a 0 due to the decreased
protections for key
minority languages.264
The remaining
protections for Arabic
and availability of
Arabic-language
education keeps the
score at 1.

West Bank
-2

Languages other than
Arabic lack
institutional protection
under the Palestinian
Authority and there are
limited Arab language
programs within Jewish
settlements in the West
Bank.

Language Rights (Implementation):

Israel
1

West Bank
-1

Despite the lack of
institutional protections
for other languages,
there has been increases
in multilingualism
among Palestinian
Arabs living in the
West Bank.265

Military Involvement (Legal):

Israel
-1

264

Israeli military symbols
are biased in favor of

West Bank
-2

Palestinian Arabs living
in the West Bank are

"Arabic Downgraded in Israel," Language Magazine, https://www.languagemagazine.com/2018/08/14/arabic-downgraded-inisrael/.
265
"West Bank Hebrew Language Study Is Growing," JPost, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/West-Bank-Hebrew-languagestudy-is-growing-307880.
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ethnically Jewish
symbols. Mandatory
military service is
limited solely to nonHaredi Jews.

ineligible to join the
Israeli military. No
Palestinian Authority
military exists.

Military Involvement (Implementation):

Israel
-1

266

In addition to the
differing legal
obligations of various
ethnic groups,
minorities often have
difficulty integrating
into the Israeli
military.266

West Bank
-2

Rhoda Kanaaneh, "Embattled Identities: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military," Journal of Palestine Studies 32, no. 3
(2003): 10, http://jps.ucpress.edu/content/32/3/5.abstract.
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Religious Rights (Legal):

Israel
-1

West Bank
Freedom of religion is
-2
protected in Israel but
freedom from religion
is not, which is one of
the reasons it received a
lower score. There is no
civil marriage in Israel
and many familyrelated laws are based
on the religious laws of
various communities
with no civil
alternative.267 State
symbols are also not
religiously neutral and
the Israeli Nation State
law further reinforced
ties between the state
and the Jewish religion.

The official religion of
the Palestinian
Authority and
Palestinian
communities of the
West Bank is Islam and
Islamic institutions are
given preferential
treatment. 268

Religious Rights (Implementation):

Israel
-1

West Bank
-2

Civic National Symbol Usage:

Israel
-2

267
268

No non-ethnic symbols
exist or are in wide
usage. Existing

West Bank
-2

https://www.thejc.com/lifestyle/family/wedding-woes-1.438450
https://fas.org/irp/news/2003/02/paconst.html

No non-ethnic symbols
exist or are in wide
usage. Existing
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symbols are biased
towards a specific
ethnic group.

symbols are biased
towards a specific
ethnic group.

Voting Rights (Legal):

Israel
-2

While Israeli Arabs and
Jews have equal voting
rights within Israel, the
fact that there is no
common legislature
voted for by both
citizens of Israel and
those of the West Bank
downgrades this score.

West Bank
-2

The fact that there is no
common legislature
voted for by both
citizens of Israel and
those of the West Bank
downgrades this score.
This is worsened by the
continual lack of
elections called by the
Palestinian Authority.

Voting Rights (Implementation):

Israel
-2

West Bank
-2

Ethnic Categories on Documents:
Israel
1

269

Labels referring to
ethnic affiliations were
removed in 2005.269

West Bank
1

ID cards issued by the
Palestinian Authority
are identical to Israeli
cards except for the
inclusion of the PNA
symbol and a flipping
of the order of Hebrew

The removal of ethnic labels on Israeli ID cards was not in order to support a non-ethnic state identity but rather due to the
fact that the Supreme Court of Israel instructed the Ministry of Interior to list those who had undergone a Reform conversion as
Jewish. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Haredi and preferred to eliminate the category for ethnicity rather than to list
individuals he saw as non-Jews as Jews.
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and Arabic on the
card.270
Ethnic Categories on Documents:
Israel
-1
Despite the removal of
the ethnic affiliations in
2005, ID cards issued
prior to then still
contain information
related to ethnic ID.
Furthermore, the
decision to include or
remove an individual’s
Hebrew birthdate on
the card is indicative of
the individual’s ethnic
group.

West Bank
-1

Equal Provision of Public Goods:

Israel
-2

270

Israelis and Palestinians
participate in two fully
separate welfare
systems. Things such as
educational funding
and other public goods
are distributed
unequally. State
spending disparities
between Jewish and
Arab students
perpetuate inequalities
between the two groups
and fail to foster a

West Bank
-2

Israelis and Palestinians
participate in two fully
separate welfare
systems. Things such as
educational funding
and other public goods
are distributed
unequally.

Prior to the removal of ethnic classification from ID cards, the ethnicity category for Palestinians was replaced with one
labeled “religion”.
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unifying national
identity.271
Coexistence Programs
Israel
0

271

Coexistence programs
exist but ones between
Israelis and Palestinians
are focused on
coexisting as neighbors
of two soon to be
separate states, not on
forming a common
identity.

West Bank
0

Coexistence programs
exist but ones between
Israelis and Palestinians
are focused on
coexisting as neighbors
of two soon to be
separate states, not on
forming a common
identity.

"Arab Sector: NIF Grantees Fight Discrimination in Arab Education," New Israel Fund,
https://web.archive.org/web/20070807221918/http://www.nif.org/content.cfm?id=2343&currbody=1.
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Figure 24: Combined Average for Israel and the West Bank (1948)

Figure 25: Combined Average for Israel and the West Bank (1966)

Figure 26: Combined Average for Israel and the West Bank (1993)

Figure 27: Combined Average for Israel and the West Bank (1993)
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Figure 28: Legal Average for Israel and the West Bank (1948)

Figure 29:Legal Average for Israel and the West Bank (1966)

Figure 30: Legal Average for Israel and the West Bank (1993)

Figure 31: Legal Average for Israel and the West Bank (2018)
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Figure 32: Implementation Average for Israel and the West Bank (1948)

Figure 33 :Implementation Average for Israel and the West Bank (1966)

Figure 34: Implementation Average for Israel and the West Bank (1993)

Figure 35: Implementation Average for Israel and the West Bank (2018)

137
District Name (1993)

Israel

West Bank

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

-2

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

-2

Language Rights (Implementation)

1

-2

Language Rights (Legal)

1

-1

Military Involvement (Implementation)

-1

-2

Military Involvement (Legal)

-1

-2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

-1

-2

Religious Rights (Legal)

-1

-2

Civic National Symbol Usage

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

-2

-2

2

2

Voting Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

0

0

-2

-2

(Legal)

-2

-2

Equal Provision of Public Goods

-2

-2

Implementation Average

-1.29

-2.00

District Name (1966)

Israel

West Bank

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

-2

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

-2

1

-2

Integrated Police (Legal)

Existence of Coexistence Programs
Ethnic Categories on Documents
(Implementation)
Ethnic Categories on Documents

Language Rights (Implementation)
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Language Rights (Legal)

1

-1

Military Involvement (Implementation)

-2

-2

Military Involvement (Legal)

-2

-2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

-1

-2

Religious Rights (Legal)

-1

-2

Civic National Symbol Usage

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Legal)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Implementation)

-1

-2

2

-2

-2

-2

-2

-2

0

0

-2

-2

Implementation Average

-1.29

-2.00

Legal Average

-0.86

-1.86

Combined Average

-1.12

-1.82

Voting Rights (Legal)
Ethnic Categories on Documents
(Implementation)
Ethnic Categories on Documents
(Legal)
Existence of Coexistence Programs
Equal Provision of Public Goods
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District Name (1948)

Israel

West Bank

School Curriculum (Implementation)

-2

-2

School Curriculum (Legal)

-2

-2

Language Rights (Implementation)

1

1

Language Rights (Legal)

1

1

Military Involvement (Implementation)

-2

-2

Military Involvement (Legal)

-2

-2

Religious Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Religious Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

Civic National Symbol Usage

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Implementation)

-2

-2

Integrated Police (Legal)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Implementation)

-2

-2

Voting Rights (Legal)

-2

-2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Implementation)

-2

-2

Ethnic Categories on Documents (Legal)

-2

-2

0

0

-2

-2

Implementation Average

-1.57

-1.57

Legal Average

-1.57

-1.57

Combined Average

-1.53

-1.53

Existence of Coexistence Programs
Equal Provision of Public Goods
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Appendix IV: Note on Intercoder Reliability
The indicators discussed in this thesis were coded independently by three individuals, the author
and two informed non-experts. Given the high intercoder reliability, the scores used within this thesis are
those coded by the author.272 Results for intercoder reliability are provided below.
Average Pairwise Percent Agreement
Average Pairwise

Pairwise Percent

Pairwise Percent

Pairwise Percent

Percent Agreement

Agreement Coders 1

Agreement Coders 1

Agreement Coders 2

and 3

and 2

and 3

97.917%

100%

97.917%

98.611%

Fleiss’ Kappa
Fleiss Kappa

Observed Agreement

Expected Agreement

0.975

0.986

0.454

Average Pairwise Cohen’s Kappa
Average Pairwise

Pairwise CK Coders 1

Pairwise CK Coders 1

Pairwise CK Coders 2

Cohen’s Kappa

and 3

and 2

and 3

0.975

0.962

1

0.962

Krippendorff’s Alpha (Nominal)
Krippendorff’s Alpha

N Decisions

Σcocc

Σcnc(nc - 1)

0.975

432

426

84280

272

Deen Freelon, "ReCal: Intercoder Reliability Calculation as a Web Service," International Journal of Internet Science 5, no. 1
(2010): 21, http://www.ijis.net/ijis5_1/ijis5_1_freelon.pdf.

